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Why do some areas in the US have higher racial disparities than others?  While a 
substantial body of research examines the role of racial or ethnic minority (descriptive) 
representatives in providing pro-minority public policy (substantive representation), there is little 
consensus over the aggregate impact of descriptive representation on the outcomes racial 
minorities experience and the factors determining the size of that impact.  In this book, I propose 
and test different theories which demonstrate the conditional link between descriptive and 
substantive representation.  In Chapter 2, I test a theory of multi-level political incorporation, 
arguing that descriptive representatives need the right political conditions to provide substantive 
representation.  In Chapter 3, I argue that descriptive representatives need members in leadership 
positions to gain agenda access to provide substantive representation.  In both these chapters, I 
examine a new dataset of over 7,000 representatives in state and local level legislatures and 
examine disparities in poverty rates and residential segregation.   I find strong evidence to 
support my theory of multi-level political incorporation and mixed evidence in support of my 
leadership theory.   In Chapter 4, I examine the role of the race and gender of representatives 
intersectionally.  I argue that the Black male and Black female representatives will differ because 






Attorneys and find compelling evidence that Black male and Black female representatives lead 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1960’s a series of riots in many of America’s largest cities captured the 
nation’s attention.  Caused primarily by the increasing frustration of Black communities at 
unequal treatment and racial disparities, these riots killed 43 in Detroit, Michigan, 23 in Newark, 
New Jersey, and claimed victims in no fewer than 23 other American cities.   President Lydon 
Banes Johnson called for a commission to be headed by Otto Kerner, the governor of Illinois, to 
answer three questions: "What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it 
from happening again and again?".  What would be called the Kerner Commission released a 
report in 1968, which concluded that America was moving "toward two societies, one black, one 
white - separate and unequal" and warned that the country could develop a system of "apartheid" 
without concerted efforts to change course.   
 The Kerner Commission failed to bring about the substantial changes it called for, 
President Johnson largely ignored the report’s findings.  However, the Kerner Commission had 
accomplished something.  For many White Americans it shined a light on the treatment of 
Blacks in America.  The report had correctly identified that the experiences of America’s Whites 
and Blacks are systematically different and systematically unequal.  And 50 years later, this is 
unfortunately still true.  Since America’s inception, with the advent of chattel slavery, through 






inequality best described by Michael Alexander1 as “The New Jim Crow”, Black Americans 
have faced a systemic oppression.  From education to the economy, the criminal justice system, 
housing, healthcare and other life spheres, Black Americans on average experience worse 
outcomes than White Americans.2   
 Importantly, while systems of oppression have been ever present throughout American 
history and the present, they have often been met with fierce opposition from the oppressed.  
There have been few advocates as important to the push towards racial equality as Black 
Americans themselves.  Both within the halls of government, and through sustained collective 
action, Black Americans have distinguished themselves in the fight for equal treatment.  The 
very first Black man to serve in Congress, Joseph Hayne Rainey in 1870, would make a name for 
himself for his fiery speeches on the floor.  During the debate of the Civil Rights Act of 1873, he 
would argue both in favor of the bill and for more equal treatment saying,  
“We do not ask the passage of any law forcing us upon anybody who does not want to 
receive us. But we do want a law enacted that we may be recognized like other men in 
the country… I say to you gentlemen, that this discrimination against the Negro race in 
this country is unjust, is unworthy of a high-minded people whose example should have a 
salutary influence in the world.”3 
And speaking against the inequality with the chamber itself, 
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“Why is it that colored members of Congress cannot enjoy the same immunities that are 
accorded to white members? Why cannot we stop at hotels here without meeting 
objection? Why cannot we go into restaurants without being insulted? We are here 
enacting laws for the country and casting votes upon important questions; we have been 
sent here by the suffrages of the people, and why cannot we enjoy the same benefits that 
are accorded to our white colleagues on this floor?”4 
 While he would lose his re-election bid in 1878, due in no small part to the mounting 
voter intimidation and suppression he warned of,5 Congressman Rainey would not be the last 
Black Congressman who would seek racial equality.  From 1870 to 2020, 183 different Black 
members would sit in Congress (153 in the House, 9 in the Senate, and 1 member in both).6  
Some of these individuals would be remembered as instrumental to the progress America has 
made in racial equality, such as John Lewis from Georgia, or Jesse Jackson, Jr. from Illinois.  
Black Congresspeople would in many ways formalize their collective push towards equality by 
forming the Black Congressional Caucus in 1971 declaring "We have no permanent friends, no 
permanent enemies—just permanent interests." 
 Black Americans seeking to bring about racial equality would not only serve in Congress.  
North Carolina Senator Floyd McKissick sponsored the Racial Justice Act, a groundbreaking 




5 “RAINEY, Joseph Hayne | US House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives,” History, Art, and Archives: 
US House of Representatives, accessed June 10, 2021, https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/R/RAINEY,-Joseph-
Hayne-(R000016)/. 
 
6 “African American Members of the U.S. Congress: 1870-2020,” Congressional Research Service, accessed June 






the Nebraska State Legislature led the charge to divest from the South African apartheid 
government, and a variety of other anti-discrimination bills.  In local governments, Kurt 
Schmoke, the first Black mayor of Baltimore, Maryland, elected in 1987, fought for drug 
decriminalization in part because of the adverse effect the War on Drugs has had on Black 
communities.  Jillian Johnson, a City Councilor in Durham, North Carolina has, among other 
issues, tried to fight against hair discrimination.  Satana Deberry, the current District Attorney 
for Durham, North Carolina, has pledged to address the systemic inequalities present in the 
criminal justice system.  These are a few examples of the substantial efforts made by those 
within government to address the racial problems that confront America.  
 These examples bring me to the central questions of this book.  What role do Black 
representatives play in reducing the lived inequalities in America?  Under what conditions 
should we expect Black representatives to successfully bring about more equal outcomes?   
In Chapter 2, I explore the role of majoritarian institutions in moderating the impact of 
Black representation on more equal policy outcomes in a multi-level governing context.  
Building on previous studies, I propose a new definition for political incorporation,7, the 
conditions under which Black representatives should be able to pass policies, to account for 
multi-level governing constraints.  I further expand on previous works by directly measuring 
Black representation at both the state and local level simultaneously.  I explore a new dataset of 
over 7,000 state and local legislators, examining disparities in poverty rates and residential 
 
7 Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, “Protest Is Not Enough: A Theory of Political 






segregation.  I find compelling evidence that Black representatives do reduce racial disparities, 
but only under the correct political context.   
In Chapter 3, I build on the findings in chapter 2 and examine the role of agenda access.  
I argue that, along with political incorporation to ensure they win votes, Black representatives 
need agenda control to ensure their priorities make it to votes.  In line with those before me I 
examine positions of institutional agenda power, namely the heads of legislatures, to measure the 
ability for Black representatives to have agenda access.  I test my theory by examining heads of 
local legislatures, expecting that more Black representatives in cities which are politically 
incorporated and have Black leaders will lead to lower racial disparities.  I find mixed support 
for the role of Black in leadership positions enhancing the power of more Black rank-and-file 
members.   
In Chapter 4, I examine the role of the race and gender of representatives intersectionally.  
To do so, I shift my focus away from state and local legislatures to District Attorneys, and from 
poverty and segregation to incarceration.  I argue that Black male and Black female 
representatives will provide act differently because of the stereotypes associated with their 
unique identities, and how these interact with elections.  Because Black women tend to be 
associated with more negative stereotypes, particularly those regarding advocacy, they will not 
be afforded the same privilege as Black men, who can adopt pro policing stances credibly.  
Testing a dataset of over 500 District Attorneys, I find that Black female representatives are 








CHAPTER 2 : MULTI-LEVEL POLITICAL INCORPORATION 
Introduction 
The 1968 Kerner Commission released a report which concluded that America was 
moving "toward two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal" and warned that the 
country could develop a system of "apartheid" if action was not taken to reduce racial disparities. 
While America has made progress in dismantling overtly racist institutions, such as the Jim 
Crow laws, the realities of racial disparities in areas as diverse as policing, housing, and 
healthcare, are front and center in American political discourse.  There have been many steps 
taken at the state and federal level to address these issues, but interestingly some local 
governments have also taken up the charge of the Kerner Commission's call to action.  Seattle 
has spent considerable resources attempting to reduce educational disparities (Morton 2018).  
Minneapolis has approved a plan to eliminate racial disparities in various measures by 2040 
(Minneapolis|2040, 2019), Cincinnati and Fort Worth have commissioned studies to investigate 
the impact of racial disparities on their minority communities.8  The National League of Cities 
has a template initiative available for local governments to follow in order to reduce the racial 
disparities in their cities (National League of Cities 2020).  But what makes some cities decide to 
 
8 Cameron Knight, “Majority of Cincinnati City Council Wants Study to Find If City Policies Are Racist,” 
Cincinnati.Com, January 2018, https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/16/majority-cincinnati-city-
council-wants-study-find-if-city-policies-racist/1036255001/; Luke Ranker, “Is Fort Worth Dealing with Racial 
Inequality When It Comes to Arrests and the Courts? Read More Here: Https://Www.Star-
Telegram.Com/News/Local/Fort-Worth/Article228497854.Html#storylink=cpy,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, March 







take action, and what determines the level of effort cities are willing to put into the undertaking?  
One explanation could be the representatives within these governments: each of the cities above 
has at least one Black representative, more than the modal US city.  It could be the case that 
having Blacks on their city council leads that city to be more likely to address racial issues.  
Since the Kerner Commission, we have seen substantial racial and ethnic diversification in 
representative bodies across the US, but does this increased representation influence the policies 
promoted by these bodies and, therefore, the racial disparities we see in society?   
In this chapter, I argue that increased Black representation, under the correct political 
conditions, leads to lower disparities in outcomes between Whites and Blacks.  When 
legislatures include large numbers of racial minorities, and those members are incorporated into 
the partisan majority, this leads to lower aggregate disparities.  However, I argue that the 
political incorporation of racial minorities necessarily needs to examine state and local politics at 
the same time.  Racial minorities in local governments are only fully incorporated when they are 
in the local majority, and the state government is not held by political rivals who can disrupt their 
plans.  I also argue that it is essential to account for legacies of racial disparities that descriptive 
representatives inherit from the past.  A minority representative cannot control the disparities that 
came before them, and therefore we need to measure how much those representatives lower the 
disparities in their cities.  I analyze a new dataset of local representatives from the 500 largest 
cities in the US, encompassing over 7,000 representatives, and the composition of state 
legislatures across the US.  Using a hierarchal linear model, I demonstrate that descriptive 






controlling for many common alternate explanations, such as Black population size and 
partisanship.    
Literature Review 
Studies of descriptive representation 
Many scholars have examined the role of descriptive representation, defined as the 
representation of groups by individuals who share that group identity (Pitkin 1967), in providing 
positive public policy decisions, or substantive representation, for historically underrepresented 
groups (generally racial or ethnic minorities, and women).  Scholars generally agree that 
descriptive representatives do behave in ways that are beneficial to the provision of substantive 
representation.9  Leveraging their unique personal experiences and connections to minority 
communities,10 minority representatives make minority issues a central concern,11 receive 
information about minority preferences differently,12 vote in favor of minority preferences,13 and 
 
9 Eric Gonzalez Juenke and Robert R. Preuhs, “Irreplaceable Legislators? Rethinking Minority Representatives in 
the New Century,” American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 3 (2012): 705–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2012.00584.x; Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the 
U.S. Congress (Princeton University Press, 2018). 
 
10 Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes,’” The 
Journal of Politics 61, no. 3 (1999): 628–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/2647821. 
 
11 Andy Baker and Corey Cook, “Representing Black Interests and Promoting Black Culture: The Importance of 
African American Descriptive Representation in the U.S. House,” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on 
Race 2, no. 2 (2005): 227–46, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X05050162; William Curtis Ellis and Walter Clark 
Wilson, “Minority Chairs and Congressional Attention to Minority Issues: The Effect of Descriptive Representation 
in Positions of Institutional Power,” Social Science Quarterly 94, no. 5 (2013): 1207–21, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12023; Katrina L. Gamble, “Black Political Representation: An Examination of 
Legislative Activity Within U.S. House Committees,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2007): 421–47, 
https://doi.org/10.3162/036298007781699663. 
 
12 Robert R. Preuhs and Rodney E. Hero, “A Different Kind of Representation: Black and Latino Descriptive 
Representation and the Role of Ideological Cuing,” Political Research Quarterly 64, no. 1 (2011): 157–71, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909346739. 
 
13 Baker and Cook, “Representing Black Interests and Promoting Black Culture: The Importance of African 






allocate resources to minority needs.14  This literature provides the mechanism by which 
descriptive representation affects substantive representation: minority representatives have an 
experiential relationship to their identity that non-group members cannot match, and this leads 
them to seek to represent their group substantively.   
While scholars have demonstrated that minority representatives behave in ways that are 
beneficial to the provision of substantive representation, there is no consensus on the aggregate 
effect of such representation on the policy decisions a legislative body makes and the outcomes 
racial minorities experience.  Some researchers have argued that more descriptive representation 
leads to more substantive representation, as these representatives are able to effectively band 
together to change legislative outcomes.15  Others, however, have argued that descriptive 
representation may not be necessary for substantive representation, or may even negatively 
impact the provision of it.   
These arguments generally follow three strands.  First, the partisanship argument 
contends that descriptive representation does not add any value beyond what electing Democrats 
 
Direct and Indirect,” American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997): 1066–71, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2111688; Neil Pinney and George Serra, “The Congressional Black Caucus and Vote 
Cohesion: Placing the Caucus within House Voting Patterns,” Political Research Quarterly 52, no. 3 (1999): 583–
608, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299905200306; Susan Welch and John R. Hibbing, “Hispanic Representation in 
the U.S. Congress,” Social Science Quarterly 65, no. 2 (1984): 328–35. 
 
14 Christian R. Grose, Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home, Book, 
Whole (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511976827. 
 
15 Robert A. Holmes, “The Georgia Legislative Black Caucus: An Analysis of a Racial Legislative Subgroup,” 
Journal of Black Studies 30, no. 6 (2000): 768–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/002193470003000604; Karin L. Stanford 
and Charles E. Jones, “Black Gold: African American Legislators in California, 1970-2008,” The Journal of Race 
and Policy 5, no. 1 (2009): 7–34; Byron D’Andra Orey, “Black Legislative Politics in Mississippi,” Journal of Black 
Studies 30, no. 6 (2000): 791; Brenda Sullivan, “Even at the Turning of the Tide: An Analysis of the North Carolina 
Legislative Black Caucus,” Journal of Black Studies 30, no. 6 (2000): 815–38, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/002193470003000606; Sharon D. Wright, “The Tennessee Black Caucus of State 







(of any race) would accomplish.16  To further complicate this, there may be costs associated with 
attempting to achieve descriptive representation, particularly at higher levels of government.  
Given the high correlation between minority population size and the electability of minority 
candidates,17 one primary method of enhancing descriptive representation is the creation of 
majority-minority districts.  However, this helps Republicans get elected in other districts (as it 
packs Democrats into the majority-minority districts), hampering the ability for the whole body 
to pass pro-minority policies.18   The second counterargument revolves around racial backlash.  
The argument holds that increasing the minority population in a government body leads the 
White members in that body to become more hostile to racial minorities and their needs, 
canceling any positive effect of the minority representatives.19  The final counterargument 
suggests that it is really large Black population shares (and therefore large Black electorates) that 
 
16 Carol M. Swain, “Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress,” in 
Harvard University Press, 1995. Xi+296 Pp, 1995, xi+296-xi+296. 
 
17 Melissa J. Marschall, Anirudh V. S. Ruhil, and Paru R. Shah, “The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions 
and Black Representation in Local Legislatures,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (2010): 107–24; 
Melissa J. Marschall and Ruhil, “The Pomp of Power: Black Mayoralties in Urban America,” Social Science 
Quarterly 87, no. 4 (2006): 828–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00438.x. 
 
18 Kimball Brace, Bernard Grofman, and Lisa Handley, “Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help 
Republicans?,” The Journal of Politics 49, no. 1 (1987): 169–85, https://doi.org/10.2307/2131139; Charles 
Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black 
Representation in Congress?,” The American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 794–812, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2945843; David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Measuring the Electoral and Policy 
Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999): 367–95, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2991799; David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss, “Racial Redistricting and Realignment in 
Southern State Legislatures,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000): 792–810, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2669282; L. Marvin Overby and Kenneth M. Cosgrove, “Unintended Consequences? Racial 
Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests,” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 2 (1996): 540–50, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2960239; Swain, “Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in 
Congress.” 
 
19 Donald P. Haider-Markel, “Representation and Backlash: The Positive and Negative Influence of Descriptive 
Representation,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2007): 107–33, 
https://doi.org/10.3162/036298007X202001; Mary Hawkesworth, “Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: 







lead to substantive representation; these voters pressure their representatives into meeting their 
needs, regardless of the representative's race.20  This is particularly problematic, as Black 
population size is normally highly correlated with descriptive representation, making it hard to 
disentangle these competing theories.  
These theories argue that more descriptive representation may lead to less observed 
substantive representation, or have no effect - by making the legislature more Republican due to 
the creation of majority-minority districts, engendering racial backlash, or simply because of the 
correlation between descriptive representation and another variable of interest.  I will account for 
these alternative explanations when building my theory and models. More importantly, I will 
address the theoretical puzzle created by the existence of multiple competing explanations by 
focusing on the specific conditions that affect how descriptive representation is translated into 
substantive outcomes for minority communities.  
What might moderate the link between descriptive and substantive representation?  
Researchers generally acknowledge the importance of political context: descriptive 
representation may only lead to substantive representation under the right political conditions.  
One primary condition for successfully translating minority representation to pro-minority policy 
is political incorporation.21  Since it is tough for racial minorities to make up the (legislative) 
 
20 David T. Canon and Richard A. Posner, Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences 
of Black Majority Districts (University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bernard L. Fraga, “Candidates or Districts? 
Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout,” American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 1 (2016): 97–122; 
Christine Leveaux-Sharpe, “Congressional Responsiveness to Redistricting Induced Constituency Change: An 
Extension to the 1990s,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2001): 275–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/440204; 
Swain, “Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress.” 
 







majority on their own, they require White allies in order to see a majoritarian body take the 
actions they seek.22 Incorporation measures the ability of minority representatives to find these 
allies.  Once minority representatives have been incorporated, an increase in minority 
representation should lead to substantive representation.23  The division of racial allies is seen as 
falling neatly along partisan lines, so most scholars measure incorporation using partisan control: 
if the Democratic party is in control, racial minorities are considered to be in the majority 
coalition and therefore incorporated.24  However, the use of partisan data has been severely 
limiting to studies of descriptive representation at the local level, where the vast majority of 
legislatures are officially nonpartisan.  Studies have either had to focus on a small subset of cities 
and collect comprehensive data on all members of the local councils25 or focus on the 
state/federal level.  This chapter will provide a new method by which to evaluate the political 
incorporation of minorities in city councils using voting data.   
Overall, existing studies of descriptive representation have led to widely divergent 
interpretations of the degree to which electing racial minorities to positions of power leads to 
governments responding to minority needs.  An approach specifying conditions under which 
descriptive representation will lead to substantive representation, such as political incorporation, 
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helps to resolve this problem. I aim to further increase the predictive power of these theories by 
expanding political incorporation theory to include what we know about multi-level governance.  
Multi-level governance and local representation 
When examining the role of multi-level governing in the impact of descriptive 
representation, it is essential first to understand what we know about descriptive representation at 
different levels of government. A large body of research at the federal level looks at the impact 
that race has had in Congress.26  However, others have noted the limitations of Congressional 
studies.  First, while the level of minority representation in Congress has increased over time, it 
may not vary enough to capture an effect.27  Second, strong partisan institutions and increasing 
polarization may decrease the observed differences between White and Black lawmakers, 
particularly in some widely used measures such as roll-call votes.28  These limitations have led 
many to investigate state legislatures,29 which provide both an increased number of cases and 
 
26 Baker and Cook, “Representing Black Interests and Promoting Black Culture: The Importance of African 
American Descriptive Representation in the U.S. House”; Epstein and O’Halloran, “Measuring the Electoral and 
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increased variance in descriptive representation levels.  There has also been an extensive 
investigation of different local offices, from city councils,30 to mayors,31 to school boards,32 
showing general support for a link between descriptive and substantive representation.     
In this chapter, I focus on state and local representation.  Whereas state governments 
receive a lot of scholarly attention, I also choose to include local representation, arguing that 
cities are a useful venue for examining the role of descriptive representation in policy formation.  
First, there is a large number of cities providing more potential cases, and the racial minority seat 
share on city councils has far more variance than that at the state or federal level.  While Black 
representation in state legislatures varies between 0 and 30 percent, Black representation on city 
councils varies from completely White to entirely Black councils.  Seeing councils with large 
minority shares can be doubly important, as it may be that descriptive representation requires a 
certain threshold of representation for their voting power to outweigh adverse effects such as 
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White backlash.  Second, large overtly-partisan legislatures may diminish the impact of 
descriptive representatives by focusing on representatives' partisanship rather than their race.33  It 
may be that descriptive representatives are more distinct in officially nonpartisan bodies.  A 
major limitation of local-level studies is the lack of concrete partisanship data, as most cities in 
the US are officially nonpartisan.  The lack of partisanship data is important because of how 
valuable partisanship is in determining minority incorporation. To account for this, I will propose 
a new method for estimating political incorporation in officially nonpartisan bodies, allowing for 
a much more intensive test of political incorporation and descriptive representation.   
However, when considering the role of minority representation in affecting the policy 
outcomes racial minorities face, examining one level of government at a time may not be 
sufficient.34  American policymaking is a highly fragmented process across multiple "territorial 
legislative bodies".35  Any particular outcome that a person may experience is the joint result of 
multiple bodies' policy decisions.36  Because multiple bodies determine a policy outcome at 
once, we should expect that descriptive representation at any or all levels should impact how 
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much substantive representation is provided.  To account for this potential discrepancy, this 
chapter will examine descriptive representation at all three major levels of government and the 
produced interactive effects on policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, this chapter will contribute to the incorporation literature by expanding our 
understanding of political incorporation to include multi-level decision making.  While each 
different legislative body may have its own independent impact, it is still the case that these 
bodies are ordered in a hierarchy, and the organizations at the top of the hierarchy may be able to 
modify how representatives below them act.37  Theoretically, incorporation is supposed to 
measure when minority representatives can turn their priorities into reality, but that can depend 
on bodies that exist above their legislature.  I will contend that racial minorities are only fully 
incorporated when the context is right at both the local and state level. 
Legacies of Disparities 
When examining the role of representation in policy formation, it is necessary to also 
consider what we know about how representatives make policy.  One of the hallmarks of policy 
formation is a strong bias towards the status quo.38  When considering a new policy, 
policymakers do not start from a clean slate; rather, they use the status quo as the baseline and 
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make small gradual adjustments to it.39  This means that when trying to understand the impact of 
descriptive representation, it is important to consider what the outcome was before descriptive 
representation had a chance to affect it, which I refer to as the legacy.  If a descriptive 
representative inherits a bad situation and improves it, this should be considered substantive 
representation and accounted for in our modeling.   
There are reasons to believe that bringing policy "legacies" into our theories and models 
of descriptive representation is important, because failing to do so may systematically lead to 
underestimating the impact of descriptive representation.  We know that anti-Black 
discriminatory policies have a unique history in the South, and scholars have found a link 
between Black population size and racially discriminatory policies.40  We also know that there is 
a strong link between Black population size and descriptive representation, and that there is more 
Black representation in the South than in the North.41  Thus, we should expect that having a large 
Black population is likely to lead to both a worse policy legacy and higher levels of descriptive 
representation.  If we only examine contemporaneous policy outcomes, this could lead to 
underestimating the impact that descriptive representatives have, as their contemporaneous 
policy outcomes are made worse by the policy legacy they inherited.  Therefore, if you do not 
account for legacies of disparities, you may be unfairly punishing descriptive representatives for 
 
39 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling’ Through,” E:CO Emergence: Complexity and Organization 12, 
no. 1 (2010): 70–80; Aaron Wildavsky, “The New Politics of the Budgetary Process,” in Scott, Foresman, 1988. 
Xxiv+468 Pp, 1988, xxiv+468-xxiv+468. 
 
40 Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen, “The Political Legacy of American Slavery,” Journal of 
Politics 78, no. 3 (2016): 621–41, https://doi.org/10.1086/686631. 
 







inheriting a worse problem, and not measuring the impact they have on improving conditions for 
their group.     
Towards a Theory of Multi-level Descriptive Representation 
I seek to examine the role of descriptive representation in reducing racial disparities in 
policy outcomes.  I argue, in line with the literature before me, that descriptive representatives 
are more likely to provide substantive representation for in-group minorities when they are 
incorporated.  When minority representatives are incorporated, they are able to turn their 
preferences into policies, and given their predisposition to address minority issues, they will 
provide substantive representation for their in-group. 
Hypothesis: When incorporated, more Black legislators will lead to more substantive 
representation, in the form of lower poverty disparities and less residential segregation 
for Blacks.  
At the state level, political incorporation is best understood using partisan control of the 
state government: when Democrats control the state government, minority representatives are 
incorporated.  However, I contend that incorporation is not always solely who is in control of 
that particular body. The hierarchy between state and local governments needs to be included in 
our understanding of local minority political incorporation.  Racial minorities are incorporated at 
the local level when two conditions are met: Democrats control the local legislature, and the state 
government is not controlled by Republicans.42 When discussing local representation, it is not 
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simply partisan control of the local body that best reflects whether the city representatives are 
capable of materializing their priorities.  It is important to remember the reality that cities are 
politically subordinate to states,43 meaning a local majority coalition can see their actions 
stymied by a state government that opposes its policy choices.  Commonly referred to as state 
preemption, this is a process by which that state supersedes local decision-making, stripping 
local representatives of their ability to make decisions.44   
For example, the city council in Durham, North Carolina, has a long history of 
descriptive representation. Still, they are unable to provide some forms of substantive 
representation, such as removing confederate statues, because the North Carolina state legislature 
has forbidden them from doing so.  So, while descriptive representatives in Durham wanted 
Confederate statues to be taken down, they were powerless to provide that form of representation 
for their city.  In this way, while the descriptive representatives are politically incorporated in 
most measures, they should not be considered so. 
There are cases of state preemption in economic policy and social policies that could 
prevent local representatives from addressing poverty disparities and residential segregation: 26 
states have preemption laws regarding a minimum wage, 22 states preempt paid leave laws, and 
11 states preempt prevailing wage laws.45  Many other states have preempted local rent 
 
43 There are institutional differences in the independence of cities across states.  However, it is always the case that 
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regulations, inclusionary zoning, or eviction protections.46 Therefore, cities are only incorporated 
if they can be sure they are not preempted at the state level, and this is only the case when allies 
at the state level have enough power to prevent state action (in other words, that the state 
government is not fully controlled by Republicans).  
Data 
Dependent Variables 
Scholars disagree over how exactly to measure what constitutes substantive 
representation for racial minorities.  While many studies look at specific actions on the part of 
representatives, such as roll call votes or bill introductions,47 this can be problematic as deciding 
which actions count as pro- or anti-minority can be difficult.  Instead, I follow other studies in 
focusing on policy outcomes as a measure of substantive representation.  This has the benefit of 
more directly measuring what I argue is the impetus behind examining descriptive 
representation; that is, does including racial minorities in positions of power lead to better 
outcomes for racial minorities?  Furthermore, instead of measuring aggregate government output 
as some have done, such as total welfare spending, I focus on a measure of disparity between the 
experienced outcomes of Blacks and Whites.  This has two benefits.  Firstly, a measure of 
disparity naturally compares outcomes for Blacks and Whites, which is substantively and 
normatively important.  If racial minorities receive slightly better outcomes when descriptively 
represented, but Whites receive far better outcomes, we may not actually be measuring 
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substantive representation.  It is hard to imagine that minority citizens would be happy to see 
other groups prospering while they are left behind.  Secondly, a disparity measure does not need 
to differentiate between minority and non-minority issues; it only needs to assume that equality 
in outcomes is something racial minorities desire.  Making that assumption, any political actions 
that make outcomes more equitable across race would count as substantive representation.      
I specifically focus on disparities in poverty rates and residential segregation.  I focus on 
these two issues for two reasons.  First, they are the product of systemic practices and 
institutions, and are within the power of governing officials to change.  Second, they severely 
and negatively impact minority communities, making them a relevant area of study.   
Poverty Disparities 
 Historically, Blacks have faced systemic economic barriers, leading to higher-than-
average poverty rates, particularly for Blacks.  For example, Blacks face discrimination in 
getting hired, especially in high-paying positions, and promotions.48  These forms of economic 
discrimination are compounded by discrimination in the most important method of upward class 
mobility: education.  Blacks are far less likely than Whites to go to a good primary school,49 or 
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go to college.50  These forces create barriers that are borne out in the data.  Nationwide, Blacks 
are impoverished at nearly twice the rate of Whites.51 
However, the systemic nature of these disparities means that governments can use their 
powers to change them.  Legislatures have a wide variety of methods to ameliorate poverty 
disparities, from targeted economic development to increasing educational opportunities in 
certain neighborhoods.  For example, given the highly segregated communities that exist in most 
American cities,52 a local government can direct growth-fostering programs to predominately 
Black communities to improve the economic situation for its Black residents, and therefore 
reduce poverty disparities between Blacks and Whites.  These tools nicely put the provision of 
this form of substantive representation well within reach of representatives.   
Poverty disparities go beyond simple economic disadvantage.  Relegating communities 
into poverty has been shown to cause negative outcomes in education53 and health,54 among 
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other effects, and can be persistent over time, leading to a cross-generation poverty trap.55  
Therefore, if we care about the ability of descriptive representatives to deliver substantive 
representation to their group, poverty disparities are one arena we should expect to see results.   
Measuring Poverty Disparities 
 Poverty disparity information was collected from the Census and a measure was 
constructed as a rate ratio.  To get this measure, I divide the rate of poverty for Blacks by the rate 
of poverty for Whites.  This creates a measure where 1 is equality, a score above 1 is a higher 
rate of poverty for Blacks than Whites, and a score between 0-1 is a rate of poverty that is higher 
for Whites than Blacks.56  This measure gets higher as the Black rate of poverty gets higher in 
relation to the White rate of poverty, or put in other words, as racial disparities get worse.   
A rate ratio should be read as what you multiply the White rate by to get the Black rate.57  For 
example, if the rate ratio is 2, you multiply the White poverty rate by two, and that is the Black 
rate.  Put another way, in this example, the Black poverty rate is twice as high as the White 
poverty rate.  Table 2-1 demonstrates this measure for three different cities.  Table 2-2 reports 
descriptive statistics for poverty rates across my sample, and Figure 2-1 shows the frequency 
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distribution.  From Table 2-2 we can see that disparities in the cities in my sample are still very 
real: in the average city, you need to multiply the White poverty rate by 2.35 to get the Black 
rate.  The frequency distribution shows that these rate ratios are largely normally distributed with 
a slight left skew. 







5% 10% 2 
5% 5% 1 
10% 5% .5 
 
Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics for Poverty Rates 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
White Poverty Rate 212 0.04 0.385 0.14 0.06 
Black Poverty Rate 212 0.09 0.682 0.30 0.09 




















 Americans in where they live, learn, and work are deeply segregated by race.58  Like 
poverty disparities, segregation is the product of intentional decisions and racialized institutions.  
Focusing on residential segregation, historically, the separation of Whites from minorities was 
enforced through de jure racialized policies. 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established in 1934, was a federal 
bureaucracy created to help Americans get into homeownership, primarily through the backing 
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of mortgages.  However, at its inception, the FHA largely refused to back mortgages in and 
around Black neighborhoods, a process called redlining.  This same agency released a handbook, 
the Underwriting Manual, which stated that "incompatible racial groups should not be permitted 
to live in the same communities", and further suggested that highways would be a good way to 
separate Black and White communities.59   
These rules were not limited to affecting the purchasing of homes and underwriting loans, 
the federal government built housing with the expressed purpose of being segregated.  The 
Public Works Administration (PWA), established in 1933, was another federal bureaucracy 
created to, among other things, solve the post-war housing shortage and create construction jobs.  
However, by its own rules, it designated new housing projects for either Whites or Blacks, often 
bulldozing previously integrated communities, deemed slums, to make way for new segregated 
ones.   These were not isolated examples, the federal government in no small way shaped 
homeownership in the post-WWII era, and it did so to create segregated communities.60   
However, de jure racial segregation is, for the most part, a fixture of the past, thanks in 
large part to the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  Why then has residential segregation endured?61  
Most scholars attribute modern patterns of residential segregation to two factors.  First, many de 
facto racialized practices were never ended and continue to perpetuate segregation.  Social 
practices such as White flight (where Whites flee neighborhoods where minorities move in) and 
 












interpersonal discrimination in the housing market, are compounded by economic forces which 
lower the housing value of Black homes and price Blacks out of White communities.62  Modern 
government activities can also exacerbate residential segregation, particularly through zoning 
laws.  For example, local governments can designate certain particularly affluent areas in such a 
way as to prevent construction aside from single-family housing units.  By preventing the 
building of more affordable housing options, these sorts of laws can perpetuate segregated 
communities, despite the lack of de jure institutions enforcing segregation.63   
Second, while the de facto policies may have ended, there was never a concerted effort to 
end the segregation they engendered, and therefore, their effects have simply continued despite 
their official demise.  Once segregated communities were created, they gained equity.  However, 
since these homes were denied to Blacks, so to was the equity built there.  While Blacks' income 
in the United States is only about 60% of White income, Black wealth is only about 5% of White 
accumulated wealth.  This wealth gap is a direct result of the history of racial discrimination in 
the housing market, as the vast majority of wealth is built through homeownership and equity.  
So, while the laws preventing Blacks from purchasing homes near Whites are no longer on the 
books, those homes are now out of the reach of most Blacks because of the lasting effects of 
those same laws.64     
Governments are not powerless to these forces.  Both the continuing de facto practices, 
and the lingering effects of de jure policies can be addressed through collective action.  For 
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example, local governments can use rent protection, inclusionary zoning, and economic 
incentives to induce residential integration.   
The effects of residential segregation are as persistent as they are detrimental to minority 
communities.  Residential segregation has been linked to lower economic opportunities for 
Blacks,65 poor health conditions,66 and an increased likelihood of being a victim of a crime.67  
Segregation also has far-reaching consequences on education for Black communities.  Not only 
are Blacks less able to afford high education, their local primary schools (themselves highly 
segregated due to segregated communities students are drawn from) lack resources as most 
school funding is drawn from local property taxes.68  This leads to worse child development, and 
long-term economic consequences for Black youth. Clearly, segregation is another policy venue 
where we should expect descriptive representatives to seek remedies.      
Measuring Segregation 
However, unlike poverty, there is no uniform method for measuring segregation.  In this 
chapter, I will use an exposure index to quantify racial segregation in different cities.69  An 
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exposure index measures how the composition of the average city resident's neighborhood varies 
according to that person's race.  This index measures a given group's exposure to all racial 
groups, including itself, in the form of a weighted average depicting the racial composition of the 
neighborhood of the average person of a given race.  You can separate each racial dyad into a 
separate score.  Therefore, if the average Black resident lives in a neighborhood that is 25% 
Black, 25% Latinx, 25% White, and 25% other, then the Black-White70 exposure score would be 
25, the Black-Black score would be 25, and so on.   
How exactly is this measure constructed?  Figure 2-2 shows an example city split into 
two neighborhoods.  In this example, each yellow house represents 100 White residents, and 
each red house, 100 Black residents.  60% of the total White population lives in neighborhood A, 
while 40% lives in neighborhood B.   This means that 60% of the White population lives in a 
neighborhood that is 10% Black, and 40% lives in a neighborhood that is 40% Black.  You then 
employ a weighted average of all the neighborhoods (in this case, 2).  Therefore, the White-
Black exposure score for this entire city consisting of two neighborhoods would be 22, meaning 




to each other.  I employ an exposure score because one weakness of the dissimilarity index is it does not tell you 
what the underlying communities look like, but only how integrated they are.  Therefore, a 95% Black city could be 
considered perfectly integrated so long as the White population within the city is evenly spread out.  An exposure 
score on the other hand, measures the average resident’s (of a specific race) experienced community.  This more 
closely gets to the underlying issues which make segregation relevant, the exposure of Blacks to Whites, and the 
resources they bring to communities.  
 
70 To read an exposure score, the first group is the group whose average neighborhood you are examining, the 
second group is which race in the neighborhood you want to examine.  In this case, we would be examining the 






Figure 2-2: Example City 
 
Source: CensusScope 
For this book, I will be examining the Black-White exposure score.71  This allows me to 
measure how exposed Blacks are to Whites on average.  As scholars have noted, increasing the 
integration of Whites and Blacks can lead to new resources and opportunities for Black 
communities.72  Given the general lack of exposure across the country, I will consider an 
increase in Black-White exposure a decrease in segregation and therefore an indicator of 
substantive representation.  The score was constructed using Census bloc data and collected from 
the CensusScope organization.    Table 2-3 shows the descriptive statistics for various exposure 
scores and the underlying population.  If communities were integrated, we should expect these 
scores to match the underlying population demographics.  Yet as you can see, on average, Black 
 
71 One potential issue with discussing residential segregation and descriptive representation, is we know that Black 
voters are an integral part to the election of Black representatives (Grose 2011).  Therefore, it could be that 
worsening segregation leads to more descriptive representation.  However, it should be noted that I predict that more 
descriptive representatives would lead to lower segregation, the opposite of this reverse causality story.   
 






residents live in communities that are about 43% White and 25% Black, in cities which are on 
average 49% White and 21% Black.   
Table 2-3: Descriptive Statistics for Exposure Scores 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Black-White Exposure 212 0.77 90.1 42.78 21.25 
Black-Black Exposure 212 1.08 91.47 25.53 23.91 
Black Pop Share 212 0.00 81.41 21.11 16.98 
White Pop Share 212 1.40 89.93 48.88 20.73 
 
To better see how these exposure scores match their underlying populations, Figure 2-3 
shows the scatter plot of the Black-White exposure score and the underlying White population 
share, while Figure 2-4 shows the scatter plot for the Black-Black exposure score and the 
underlying Black population share.  Cities that are integrated should be around the center 45-
degree line; as the share of the target population goes up, so to should the exposure score.  In the 
case of the Black-White exposure score, dots below the 45-degree line represent cities where the 
exposure of Blacks to Whites is disproportionately low.    In the case of the Black-Black 
exposure score dots above the line represent cities where the exposure of Blacks to other Blacks 
is disproportionately high.  As we can see, while there is certainly a correlation between the size 
of the population and the exposure of Blacks to this population, there is a pattern of segregation 









Figure 2-3: Black-White Exposure / White Population Scatter Plot 
 
 









 To test my hypothesis, I use a newly collected dataset of over 7,000 representatives at the 
state and local level.  This dataset covers the 500 largest cities as identified by the Census 
(designated in the Census as "places"), across 43 states. Of those, 212 cities across 31 states are 
included in the models due to missing data.73  Information about local representatives was 
collected for the year 2016, before November.74  Information was gathered through a variety of 
public resources, but mainly was done through city council websites.  For each local 
representative, I used photographs to determine their race and ethnicity.75  I coded race and 
ethnicity as mutually exclusive, so White means non-Hispanic White, Black means non-Hispanic 
Black, and Hispanic covers any race that is ethnically Hispanic.  State legislatures' racial 
demographic information was gathered from the National Conference of State Legislators and 
combines representatives from every chamber in the state.  I do not include the aggregate level of 
representation at the federal level, as that is constant across the US.76   
Table 2-4 shows the racial breakdown for different types of representatives in the data 
set.  Table 2-5 shows descriptive statistics for the Black representation variables.  Black 
 
73 The major contributor to data loss comes from the introduction of population controls and legacy data, which will 
be discussed later.  The main consequence of these decisions is to drop cities that are primarily White, and generally 
lack Black representation.  This will be discussed at length in the Appendix C. 
 
74 This information was gathered in 2018-2019, to find past members I used internet archives of city council pages 
or city council minute archives for individual cities.  Minutes were used to identify who occupied the seats in 2016, 
then broader internet searches were used to obtain pictures.  I coded the relevant local legislatures in the city, 
regardless of official title, but will refer to these collectively as city councils.     
 
75 For representatives that were hard to code using a photograph, for example for those with less defined racial 
phenotypes, I used alternate sources such as self-described race, in order to code these individuals. 
   






representatives make up about 23% of city council seats, about 15% of mayors, and 12% of state 
legislators.  Figure 2-5 shows a frequency distribution for city council Black representation 
across my sample.  We can see that a plurality of cities have no Black members on their councils, 
creating a right skew to the distribution.  
 I operationalize descriptive representation as the number of seats held by Blacks in a 
legislature divided by the number of total seats, not including Hispanics or others. Put another 
way, Black share equals Black seats/ (White seats + Black seats).  This creates a measure that 
accounts for different sizes of legislatures, while also removing all groups besides Whites and 
Blacks, as their role in the descriptive representation of Blacks is outside the scope of this 
project. Regarding that, there are two main theories about how the representation of other 
minority groups (namely Latinx) will contribute to the substantive representation of Blacks.  
Some argue that other minority representatives will band together with Black representatives to 
provide substantive representation for all minorities, sometimes referred to as creating a 
"rainbow coalition".77  However, others have argued that minorities may compete with each 
other for scant resources, creating a negative relationship between increased non-Black minority 
representation and Black substantive representation.78  While the contradictory findings warrant 
more research, this lies beyond the scope of this book, which will solely focus on the Black-
White dynamic.  Furthermore, other racial minorities do not make up a large share of descriptive 
 
77 Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, “Protest Is Not Enough: A Theory of Political Incorporation.” 
 
78 Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah, “The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local 
Legislatures”; Rene R. Rocha, “Black-Brown Coalitions in Local School Board Elections,” Political Research 






representatives in my sample, below 7% of combined city councilors, further limiting the impact 
of this decision.   
Table 2-4: Representative Race Across City and State Governments 
  City Council Mayor State Leg. 
Race  N %  N % N % 
White 1,371 68.79 179 84.43 3,805 79.17 
Black 472 23.65 33 15.56 576 12.00 
Hispanic 120 6.01 0 0 260 5.41 
Other 33 1.65 0 0 165 3.43 
Total 1,996 100 212 100 4,806 100 
 
   Table 2-5: Descriptive Statistics for Black Representation 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Black City Council Share 212 0 88.89 23.59 22.11 
Black State Legislature 212 1.04 28.28 12.90 6.30 
Black House Rep. 212 0 1 0.01 0.12 
Black Mayor 212 0 1 0.16 0.40 
*For the city council, state legislature variables, the share is calculated as the Black seats/ (Black + White seats).  













Figure 2-5: Frequency Distribution For Black Council Percent 
 
Incorporation 
Integral to my theory is the incorporation of descriptive representatives.  At the state 
level, I measure incorporation as many before me have: minority representatives are incorporated 
if Democrats have unified control of the state government or if they comprise a majority on the 
council.  As discussed earlier, I define incorporation at the local level as a combination of local 
and state contexts.  This definition has two requirements for a city to be coded as politically 
incorporated: the city must be controlled by Democrats or Blacks must be in the majority, and 
the state must not be under unified Republican control.  This captures both the ability for local 
representatives to pass laws in their own chamber, and the lack of a unified government above 
them that may preempt them.  In order to code these two measures of incorporation, I begin with 
the partisan make-up of state governments.  State partisanship data is widely available and was 






control only if one party controlled all legislative bodies and the governorship; otherwise, there 
were coded as split partisan control.   
However, measuring partisan control at the local level is far more complicated.  The vast 
majority of the city governments are officially nonpartisan.  However, even cities that are 
officially nonpartisan are still filled with individuals who will either be willing to form a 
coalition with racial minorities or not.  In other words, minority incorporation does not depend 
on a city being officially partisan.  I estimate this local incorporation using local voting data, 
arguing that voters who are willing to vote for a Democrat are likely to also vote locally for those 
who are sufficiently racially liberal as to vote with minority councilors.  However, there is little 
information for voting data at the city level.  I start the estimation process by using voting data at 
the precinct level from the 200879 presidential election, provided by the Harvard Election Data 
Archive.  I then use a new process borrowed from the gerrymandering literature to translate this 
precinct-level data into different city limits while accounting for population clustering.80  This 
gives me the best estimates available for the partisan81 breakdown for voters within a city's 
boundaries.  I then assume that if the majority of voters in a city voted for Obama, then those 
voters would also elect a city council whose majority is willing to vote with minority 
representatives, incorporating them at the local level.   
 
79 2008 presidential election data is used because 2016 precinct returns are not available in the format required in 
order to match precincts to cities.   
 
80 John A. Curiel and Tyler Steelman, “Redistricting Out Representation: Democratic Harms in Splitting Zip 
Codes,” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 17, no. 4 (2018): 328–53. 
 
81 It should be noted this is measuring all voters on the same national partisan scale, as all voters are evaluating vote 
choice for the same candidate.  While it is true local understandings of partisanship probably vary greatly, it is useful 
to use a national measure because the idea is not to measure what a voter calls themselves, but how willing they 






This approach has some limitations.  We know that the electorate at the national level is 
not the same as the electorate at the local level. Voters' preferences could also be different at the 
national and local level.  To address these concerns, I validate this method using a test dataset.  I 
use this method to estimate partisan control for the 42 cities that have official partisan 
information, and for which election information is available.  The method successfully predicts 
partisan control in 35 of the cases (85%).  While this method is certainly not perfect, I argue it is 
a reasonable way to estimate the incorporation of minorities on officially nonpartisan bodies, and 
the data validation shows that this method is similar to the normal partisanship-based 
incorporation approach. 
   I use these data to code cities as Republican or Democratically controlled.  However, as 
discussed earlier, I seek to model multi-level incorporation.  In this vein, if the city is 
Democratically controlled, and the state is Democratically controlled or has split partisan 
control, this city is coded as being locally incorporated.  Table 2-6 presents descriptive statistics 
for my partisanship/incorporation measures.  This table shows that the majority of my cases are 
cities with Democratic control (81%), but many of these Democratic cities exist in states 
controlled by the Republicans (about 40% of the sample).     
This leaves me with two different measures of incorporation: one for state governments 
and one for local governments.  Both of these measures will be used in interaction terms with the 
level of Black representation in their respective bodies.  
 






Table 2-6: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Democratic City Council 0 1 0.81 0.40 
Multi-Level City 
Incorporation 
0 1 0.41 0.49 
Unified Democratic State 0 1 0.19 0.39 
 
Controls 
 While the main goal of this analysis is to evaluate the influence of descriptive 
representation on racial disparities in poverty rates and housing segregation, I must also control 
for other theoretically informed covariates, which might influence these disparities. I include 
controls for legacies of disparities, having a Black representative in the House, having a Black 
mayor, the share of the population that is Black (for the poverty rates model), state legislature 
professionalism, being in the South, the share of the population that is White (for the segregation 
model), and the White poverty rate (for the segregation model).   
 One thing we know about policymaking is that the process is highly incremental, as 
policymakers start with existing policies and move from there.  This means that policy outcomes 
are very "sticky" over time, and high disparities will tend to perpetuate themselves.  If 
descriptive representatives tend to be from places that have worse starting points, I could 
inadvertently punish them for inheriting a worse starting point (or vice versa), and not fully 
measure the impact they have on improving the disparities.  To successfully control for the 
policy starting point, which I call the legacy, it would be best to find the poverty rate disparity 






intensive, this dataset only covers one time point, and it is impossible to know exactly when this 
is for every city.  I use the poverty rate disparity and segregation disparity in 1970 to proxy this.  
1970 as a starting point is both convenient and theoretically relevant: census data for specific 
cities before 1970 can be significantly harder to access, and this time period predates modern 
patterns of descriptive representation.  Before 1970, the levels of descriptive representation are 
far lower, particularly because of the lack of federal voting protections, which was only fully 
instituted in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  For example, the total number of local 
representatives increased 300% from 1972 to 2000.82  Table 2-7 presents descriptive statistics for 
the legacy terms and other relevant controls.   
The average poverty disparities, measured in rate ratios, were much higher in the past: on 
average, cities reduced their poverty disparity ratio by 1.79, almost half the average starting 
disparity ratio of 4.14.  Conversely, segregation has actually gotten worse in the aggregate, the 
exposure score fell from about 59 to 42.  This means the average Black individual lived in 
communities with almost 17% more Whites in them.  By including the legacy term in the model, 
I more accurately measure how descriptive representatives change policy to the benefit of their 
group, rather than an association of high descriptive representation and low disparities.  
Furthermore, I am accounting for a potential underestimation bias introduced by not including 




82 Paru R. Shah, Melissa J. Marschall, and Anirudh V. S. Ruhil, “Are We There Yet? The Voting Rights Act and 







Table 2-7: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation and Controls 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Legacy Poverty Rate Ratio 0.84 10.35 4.14 1.75 
Legacy Exposure Score 2.51 97.98 58.64 27.93 
Black Population Share 0.00 81.41 21.11 0.157 
State Professionalism 4.80 62.90 34.35 17.06 
South 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.48 
White Population Share 1.40 89.93 48.88 20.72 
White Poverty Rate 0.04 0.385 0.14 0.06 
 
While levels of federal descriptive representation do not vary across the US, certain 
places may be specifically represented by a Black member of the House of Representatives (I do 
not examine the Senate due to low levels of descriptive representation in this body, and I do not 
investigate Black governors for the same reason).  Scholars have shown that Black 
congresspeople are very successful in supporting racialized projects in their districts, and could 
be responsible for local improvements.83  I control for this using a dummy variable for having a 
Black House representative.84  About 1% of cities in my sample have a Black House 
Representative. 
 Many descriptive representation studies have examined the role of Black mayors and 
Black voters in providing substantive representation for their cities.  As such, it is important to 
disentangle the impact of Black executives and Black population size from the effect of Black 
 
83 Grose, Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home. 
 








legislators.  To do so, I include a dummy variable for Black mayors, coded 1 if the mayor of the 
city is Black, 0 otherwise.85  I also control for the share of the population that is Black, as 
reported by the Census.  About 16% of cities had a Black mayor, and the average Black 
population share was about 21%, slightly above the national average. 
 We also know that state legislatures vary widely across the US in how professional they 
are.  If a certain state has institutions that make it more capable of problem solving, it could be 
the case that states could address poverty disparities better than others.  I use a standard measure 
of professionalism, the Squire index, to control for these differences in problem-solving 
capabilities between state governments.86  I use the mean professionalism score for the 
legislative bodies for that state.  This ranges from about 5 to 63, with an average score of 34, 
with higher scores representing states that are more professional.   
 It is also essential to control for a state being in the South (the states from the former 
Confederacy).  This region has a specific history of racial oppression and separation that could 
lead it to have higher disparities across a wide variety of measures.  I code states as 1 if they 
were in the former Confederacy, and 0 otherwise. 
 For my segregation model, I include two other controls, the White population share and 
the White poverty rate.  I control for the White population share, as it is linked to the Black-
White exposure score closely.  As the White share of the population rises, the exposure score 
should rise, and indeed Figure 2-3 shows this relationship is quite strong.  By controlling for this, 
I am better capturing the distortion from integration.  However, because the White population 
 
85 Recall that all cities with non-White or Black mayors were dropped from the sample. 
 






share and the Black population share are inherently linked, I drop the Black population share 
variable from my segregation model to avoid multicollinearity issues.  I also control for the 
White poverty rate, as it could be the case that integration only increases in some cities because 
there is a larger poor White community that might be in Black neighborhoods.  By controlling 
for the poverty rate for Whites, my model better measures the integration of Blacks into affluent 
areas.   
Methods 
To examine my theory, I employ the hierarchal linear models specified below, using state 
random effects. 
Segregation Model: Poverty Disparities= Legacy Score + State Black Representation + 
State Incorporation+ State Black Representation * State Incorporation + City Black 
Representation + City Incorporation + Black House Rep. + City Black Representation 
* City Incorporation + Black House Rep. + State Professionalism + Black Mayor + 
South + White Population Share + White Poverty Rate + State Random Effects 
 
 
Poverty Model: Poverty Disparities= Legacy Disparity + State Black Representation + 
State Incorporation+ State Black Representation * State Incorporation + City Black 
Representation + City Incorporation + Black House Rep. + City Black Representation 
* City Incorporation + Black House Rep. + State Professionalism + Black Mayor + 
South + Black Population Share + State Random Effects 
Results 
In the following section, I discuss the results of running the hierarchal linear model, 
shown in Table 2-8.  I begin with a description of the results from the segregation model, then 
discuss the poverty model.  Importantly, the segregation model is predicting Black- White 
exposure, and as the measure goes up, segregation is going down.  The poverty rate ratio is 






goes up, the disparities are going up.  This means that, according to my hypotheses, I expect to 
find that representation will have a positive effect in the segregation model, and a negative effect 




























Legacy  0.235***  0.072* 
 (0.014) (0.029) 
Percent State Leg. Black -0.214***  0.002 
 (0.061) (0.012) 
State Incorporation -11.695 -0.742 
 (7.406) (1.096) 
State Incorporation * Percent State Leg. 
Black 
 1.403*  0.088 
 (0.641) (0.098) 
Percent City Council Black -0.075***  0.006 
 (0.023) (0.005) 
City Incorporation -1.747*  0.774*** 
 (0.851) (0.171) 
City Incorporation * Percent City Council 
Black  
0.065** -0.017*** 
 (0.024) (0.004) 
Black House Rep  2.752 -0.016 
 (1.822) (0.407) 
State Leg. Professionalism -0.100** -0.022** 
 (0.039) (0.007) 
Black Mayor  1.304 -0.060 
 (0.943) (0.144) 
South -0.208  0.099 
 (1.044) (0.168) 
Black Population Share - -0.917 
 - (0.520) 
White Population Share  76.520*** - 
 (1.785)  
White Poverty Rate  7.768 - 
 (4.751)  
Constant -3.618  2.554*** 
 (1.999) (0.249) 
 State RE Yes Yes 
N 212 212 







Segregation Model Results 
 For the model predicting residential segregation, I find a positive and significant 
relationship between descriptive representation, at the state and local level, and reducing 
segregation, however, only when representatives are incorporated.  This effect is substantively 
large as well.  At the city level, moving from an all-White to an all-Black council increases the 
exposure score by about 6.  In the real world, this would mean the average Black resident would 
live in a community that is 6 percent Whiter.  At the state level, moving from the smallest share 
of state legislatures (1%) to the highest (28%) would result in a subsequent increase in the 
exposure score of about 30.   
 When Black representatives are not incorporated the story is a little less clear.  At the 
state and local levels, I see a negative and significant relationship between the share of the 
legislature that is Black and the exposure score.  This means that as legislatures (without 
incorporation) get more Black members, segregation gets worse, perhaps pointing towards racial 
backlash politics.  Incorporation without descriptive representatives also has a negative 
coefficient, but it is only significant in the local context.  This is a bit strange, as incorporation is 
meant to measure the presence of allies; instead, I find that localities that meet these conditions, 
but do not have Black representatives are worse than localities that do not meet them.  While the 
fact that areas with White "allies" are actually worse may seem surprising, this corresponds to 
some existing evidence showing that White co-partisans may not be beneficial to the provision of 
substantive representation when racial minorities are not present (Clark 2019).   
Figure 2-6 and 2-7 shows the predicted exposure score, for different levels of Black 






area represents the 95% confidence interval.    We can see that in states where Black 
representatives are not incorporated (Republican controlled), increasing Black representation 
leads to lower exposure, and increased segregation.  However, when Black representatives are 
incorporated, this effect is the opposite, and increased levels of descriptive representation are 
leading to less disparate policy outcomes.  This is slightly different at the local level.  In local 
legislatures without incorporation, increases in Black representation lead to precipitous increases 
in segregation, however, when incorporated, there is only almost no effect.  In both cases, the 
effect of incorporation on descriptive representation is apparent.  For state governments we see 
that adding descriptive representatives when these representatives are politically incorporated 
leads to lower levels of segregation.  In localities we see that adding representatives outside the 
incorporation context leads to more segregation, but when incorporated this negative effect is 
mitigated.   







Figure 2-7: Predicted Black-White Exposure Score 
 
Figure 2-8 and 2-9 show the marginal effect plots of this interaction for state and local 
incorporation respectively.  We see the same pattern described before: incorporated states and 
localities start worse than non-incorporated areas, but as Black representation rises, integration 
increases. These figures bring the results into sharp relief: descriptive representation can lead to 





























Figure 2-9: Marginal Effect of Incorporation at City Level on Segregation 
 
Taken together, these results firmly support my hypothesis for the local and state level: 
when minority representatives are incorporated, they provide substantive representation for their 
group, yet when they lack incorporation, they have little noticeable effect on disparities.  It 
doesn't matter how many descriptive representatives are in the room if they cannot pass the 
policies they want. 
 My model also shows a strong positive relationship between the legacy term, the White 
population share, and segregation.  These results are not surprising: as discussed, we know that 
policy outcomes are sticky over time, and we saw a strong correlation between White population 






the state legislature's professionalism. I did not find a significant relationship for Black House 
Representatives, Black mayors, being in the South, or the White poverty rate. In the next section, 
I will discuss possible reasons that some of the potential controls did not return significant 
findings.   
Poverty Model Results 
For the model predicting poverty disparities different measurements of descriptive 
representation, I find a negative and significant relationship between descriptive representation at 
the local level and poverty disparities, but only when these representatives are incorporated.  
This effect is substantively large: moving from an all-White council to an all-Black council 
decreases the poverty disparity score by 1.7, this is more than the average disparity score across 
the sample, and is roughly the equivalent of going from a Black poverty rate being about three 
times higher than the White rate to racial parity.  However, when minorities are not incorporated, 
the coefficient is positive, insignificant, and close to zero.  I find that local incorporation without 
Black representation has a positive and significant relationship with disparities.  This is the same 
relationship described in the segregation model: incorporated areas, that is areas we normally 
suspect are filled with those who are willing to work with racial minority members, are worse 
than their non-incorporated counterparts when Blacks are not "in the room."   
Figure 2-10 shows the predicted poverty disparities, for different levels of Black 
representation, for cities that are incorporated and cities that are not.  These groups are very 
different, highlighting the importance of political context when examining descriptive 
representation.  When incorporated, increasing minority representation leads to lower predicted 






disparities as Blacks gain more seats.  We can also see that without Black representation, 
incorporation exacerbates disparities. This means that while racially diverse Democratically 
leaning areas have the lowest disparities, they are followed by Republican-leaning areas, and 
then White Democratically leaning areas.  Figure 2-11 shows the marginal effect of city 
incorporation on poverty disparities as Black representation increases.  Here we see the same 
pattern: incorporated cities start off worse than non-incorporated cities, but as Black 
representation grows, this effect lowers until incorporated cities have lower disparities than non-
incorporated cities.   












Figure 2-11: Average Marginal Effect of City Incorporation on Poverty Disparities 
 
These figures paint an interesting relationship between Black representation and 
partisanship, which is in line with the results from my segregation model.  While Black 
representation does lead to lower disparities when incorporated, much of the impact Black 
representatives have is in lowering the high disparities associated with localities that are White 
(i.e., lack Black representation), but are politically incorporated.   
I see fewer convincing results for state legislatures, Black mayors, and Black House 
members.  Not only is the interaction term for states insignificant, but it is also positive, the 
opposite of what was expected.  Black representation at the state level has a coefficient close to 
zero, which is also insignificant, and state incorporation (Democratic unified control of the state) 
has a negative and insignificant coefficient.   
I also find negative relationships for having a Black House representative and having a 






effect on macro-level changes for all cities, while being less useful when trying to explain 
intercity differences, which are the unit of analysis in this test.  I am surprised that Black mayors 
were not seen as having a large impact, as many scholars have found the opposite.87  It may 
simply be the case that Black mayors have no effect when controlling for representatives in the 
legislature, have effects in different arenas, or that their impact is small in comparison to the 
local legislators.  
I find that the legacy of poverty disparities is positively associated with contemporary 
disparities, demonstrating the sticky nature of disparities over time.  The results suggest that 
institutional differences may also play a role in the reduction of racial disparities in poverty rates.  
State legislative professionalism has a negative and significant coefficient.  Substantively, 
moving from the least professional to most professional state legislature would lead to reducing 
the disparities in your town by about 0.7, which's roughly equivalent to going from a Black rate 
twice the size of the White rate to parity. This provides some evidence that professionalized state 
legislatures may be more capable of problem-solving, and investigating a similar measure at the 
local level may warrant further scholarship.  I will discuss later how this result speaks to future 
research regarding institutional effects on substantive representation.  I find a positive but 
insignificant relationship between being in the South and poverty disparities, and a negative and 
insignificant relationship between Black population share and poverty disparities.   
To conclude, I find broad support for my hypothesis: descriptive representation does lead 
to lower disparities, but only in the right political contexts (i.e., when Democrats have control of 
 
87 Behr, “Black and Female Municipal Employment: A Substantive Benefit of Minority Political Incorporation?”; 
Kerr et al., “When Does Politics Matter? A Reexamination of the Determinants of African-American and Latino 
Municipal Employment Patterns”; Nye, Rainer, and Stratmann, “Do Black Mayors Improve Black Relative to White 






the city and Republicans do not control the state).  Interestingly, I also find that this political 
context without Black representatives actually exacerbates disparities.  This runs contrary to the 
argument that it is not descriptive representation but rather partisanship that drives substantive 
representation.  These findings provide new insight into the value of a multi-level governing 
approach, as well as fully conceptualizing the political conditions under which we expect 
descriptive representatives to provide substantive representations.   
Conclusion 
The descriptive representation of Blacks in the American government is a subject that has 
received a lot of scholarly attention, but with widely different expectations and results.  My work 
shows that descriptive representation can be effective in not only changing political behavior, but 
also in creating tangible benefits for minority constituents, decreasing racial disparities that have 
proven to be persistent over time - under the right political circumstances.  Extending the extant 
literature, I argue and demonstrate that investigating the link between descriptive and substantive 
representation requires a more in-depth and theoretical understanding of the political context 
around descriptive representatives.  My work provides reasoning as to how multi-level 
governance mediates our previous understanding of political incorporation.  It is not enough for 
descriptive representatives to be incorporated into their political organization if their political 
rivals can stymie their progress at a higher level of government.  
Empirically, this chapter adds to our understanding of descriptive representation in two 
ways.  First, it solves some data issues that have prevented large scale research into political 
incorporation at the local level.  Scholars have normally used official partisanship data to 






nonpartisan city councils are.  The proposed design employs cutting edge methods from the 
gerrymandering literature to estimate the partisanship of the electorate in a city, then uses this 
data to estimate political incorporation in that city, showing a high degree of success in 
predicting partisan control over a test dataset.  Second, using a multi-level incorporation 
definition, I demonstrate robust support for my hypothesis: when the political context is right, 
descriptive representation leads to lower disparities.  Interestingly, I find that political 
incorporation—that is, the control of the legislature by groups we normally consider to be 
political allies to racial minorities, specifically the Democratic party- without Black 
representation leads to higher disparities in the poverty rate.  This is contrary to the idea that 
substantive representation is tied solely to partisanship and not descriptive representation,88 but is 
in line with some other scholars who have argued that White Democrats may not be the panacea 
for racial issues.89   
Future scholars may find it useful to continue examining this relationship, and further 
explore how bodies with a large number of White Democrats compare to multiracial Democratic 
assemblies.  Similarly, future research should look into how different sets of institutions affect 
the importance of political constraints.  For example, we know that there is a significant variation 
between states in the constitutional protections those states provide to their local governments.  It 
seems reasonable to argue that cities that have a wider degree of political protection should be 
less likely to be limited by state interference.  Lastly, future work should look into how other 
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racial groups fit into this picture, as well as how the intersection of race and gender plays a role.  
Does increasing Hispanic representation increase or decrease the substantive representation of 
Blacks?  Is it important for Black males to be represented by Black males?  Is that dependent on 
the policy area?   Examinations into these areas should continue to further our understanding of 
what mediates the link between minority representation and the provision of substantive 




















CHAPTER 3 : DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AND AGENDA CONTROL 
Introduction 
The 1990 Mississippi redistricting process saw an interesting moment of bipartisanship.  
Black Democrats and White Republicans found themselves working together to create majority-
minority legislative districts.  The creation of these districts in Mississippi was intended to 
increase diversity in the legislature by creating districts that would likely elect Blacks.  And it 
worked.  However, despite the subsequent increase in the number of Black representatives, some 
expressed concerns that these new representatives wouldn’t necessarily lead to drastic political 
changes.  As an example, in a 1993 radio interview Rep. Barney Schoby (D) said, “there has 
been an effort to send a message to us [Black representatives], and to Black Mississippians, that 
no matter what your numbers in the legislature, we’re going to still control things”.90  While 
Whites within the legislature had lost seats, they were clearly not concerned this would lead to a 
loss of control.  White representatives knew they could keep political control despite losing votes 
because they still held the important positions within the legislature, and by extension, held 
control over the legislative agenda.  While Black representatives had more collective votes, 
Whites within the legislature had no intention of letting them use them.     
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In the previous chapter, I sought to explore under what conditions descriptive 
representation would lead to more equitable policy outcomes.  In it, I focused on how 
majoritarian institutions that govern the voting process would act as a barrier to translating 
descriptive representation into substantive representation.  This left out one important part of the 
discussion, however: not all issues get to be voted on.  It has been said that “the most important 
part of the legislative decision process is the decision about which decision to consider”.91  In 
this chapter, I will explore how legislative agenda access, the ability to control what gets voted 
on, is another mediator to the link between descriptive and substantive representation.   In doing 
so, I will explore how access to positions of institutional power with legislatures, something 
historically denied to racial and ethnic minorities, can be a powerful tool to advancing minority 
political goals.   
While most studies of legislative agenda setting focus on the federal or state legislatures, 
I will focus on legislatures at the local level in this chapter.  Moving to the local level is useful 
for two reasons.  First, localities are an important part of the policymaking process, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter.  Second, minorities have historically been underrepresented in 
positions of legislative agenda-setting power at the state and federal level, which has made 
investigations into positions such as majority leaders difficult.  This issue is mitigated at the local 
level: Blacks have made more inroads into the highest level of institutional legislative agenda-
setting power here.  The increased number of cases allows for examinations of descriptive 
representation in these positions and its effect on policy outcomes.    
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I am not the first author to discuss the importance of agenda-setting in the legislative 
process.  Most scholars understand a political agenda as a sort of priorities list, which describes 
what issues we think are important and need to be discussed or fixed.92  However, our ability to 
discuss issues is not infinite, and this means by definition, some things will be on the agenda, and 
some things will be left off of it.  And because of this, legislatures, like any other organization, 
must choose which problems to devote their scarce resources, such as time and attention, too.  
Essentially, only so much can get discussed, and only so many votes can be held, so legislatures 
must decide which issues to discuss and what votes to have.   
How do they make these decisions on a day-to-day basis?  Much of the political agenda 
exists as an exogenous force outside the legislatures: as problems pile up in a policy area, our 
attention naturally switches to this issue, and legislatures are forced to make decisions regarding 
it.93  However, legislative institutions still play a major role in deciding which issues that have 
“bubbled up” actually get to the floor.  Scholars have noted that these decisions are given to 
select members of the legislature in order to reduce chaos and enable efficient policymaking.94  
There are two types of positions scholars generally consider when examining agenda-setting 
power in Congress95 and within state legislatures: committee chairs (Ellis and Wilson 2013) and 
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party leadership.96  In this chapter, I will focus on these positions of institutional power, 
specifically majority leaders, as it is in these positions that descriptive representatives can try to 
use agenda-setting powers to affect policy changes. 
Understanding who determines the political agenda is integral to any theory of 
substantive representation, because substantive representation cannot be obtained if it does not 
first get on the agenda.  Those who determine the agenda can prevent, or enable, the provision of 
substantive representation through their agenda-setting tools.  If they oppose the substantive 
representation of minorities’ issues, they can ensure such reforms never see the light of day, and 
never receive a vote.  If, however, they seek to provide substantive representation, they can push 
these issues to the forefront of the agenda.   
Party Leadership 
Mitch McConnell, the former Senate Majority Leader from Kentucky, probably summed 
up the agenda-setting power of his position as a majority leader best.  Speaking to a crowd in 
Kentucky, he said,  
“If I’m still the majority leader of the Senate after next year, none of those things are 
going to pass the Senate.  They won’t even be voted on. So, think of me as the Grim 
 
recent works have begun to challenge the perceived weakness of party leadership in controlling the agenda in the 
Senate (Gailmand and Jenkins 2007).   
 






Reaper: the guy who is going to make sure that socialism doesn’t land on the president’s 
desk.”97 
Now, his point here is very clear.  He had the power, as the majority leader, to ensure that 
things he (and his caucus) did not like will not pass.  But beyond that, he spoke to his power to 
ensure that these things do not even make it to a floor vote, because he controls the legislative 
agenda thanks to his position.  The Majority Leader’s power over the legislative agenda fits the 
cartel theory of legislative agenda-setting.98  In this theory, partisan legislators in the majority 
cede control over the legislative agenda to their party leaders to ensure that items that may 
damage their party do not make it to the floor.  In this way, control over the legislative agenda is 
cartelized under the majority party in order to limit the influence of the minority as much as 
possible and better the chances of the majority to pass legislation and maintain their majority 
status.  This theory emphasizes the role of majority party leaders in denying agenda access to 
certain proposals, called negative agenda control, rather than being able to proactively add things 
to the agenda, called positive agenda control.99  Therefore, according to this theory, the party 
leadership is instrumental in deciding what does not make it to the floor for a vote. 
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Others have noted that party leaders also play a role in positive agenda setting, primarily 
through their ability to control the information that rank-and-file members need.100  This is why, 
for example, the Republican plan to repeal the Affordable Care Act in 2017 was kept literally 
under lock and key in the basements of Congress.  By controlling information on the plan, party 
leaders hoped to control the agenda space on the issue, and although this bill would eventually 
fail to pass in the Senate, this example still demonstrates the enormous power of party leadership 
to control the legislative agenda.  After all, the bill the leadership wanted got to be voted on, not 
the bill some maverick in the chamber would have preferred.     
The importance of majority party leadership in shaping the legislative agenda in state 
governments is less clear.  Each state legislature has its own set of institutions, which affect the 
level of control the party leaders have over the legislative agenda.101  That being said, it is 
generally understood that much like Congress, majority leaders in state legislatures are a very 
important part of forming the legislative agenda.102  For example, during the COVID-19 
pandemic, Republican leadership in the Kansas House and Senate focused their caucus on 
rescinding a mask mandate set by their governor Laura Kelly in less than a week.103  The 
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governor made it very clear that she understood that because the party leadership stood against 
her orders, they were unlikely to last long.  In an interview, she said  
“Republican leadership in the legislature has sent a very loud message that it won’t stick 
but that doesn’t relieve me of my responsibilities as governor which is to mandate a mask 
for a little while longer until we can ensure we have herd immunity across the state.” 
These studies demonstrate the immense power of the majority party, through its 
leadership, in shaping the legislative agenda at the federal level and state level.   
Committee Chairs 
While majority party leaders have a great deal of control over the broad legislative 
agenda, they are not the only members making agenda-setting decisions.  In fact, one of the most 
important powers that majority party leaders have in controlling agenda access is their ability to 
choose committee chairs.  State legislatures and Congress both rely on a committee system in the 
lawmaking process, and bills generally need to make it through committees before they can 
make it to the floor for a vote.  These committees, each in control of a specific focus or 
jurisdiction, such as agriculture or natural resources, need to sign off on bills within their 
jurisdictions before they move forward.  This means that committees have agenda control within 
the scope of their committee’s jurisdiction.   
The most important member of these committees is the committee chair.  Chairs of 
committees have the power to manipulate policy agendas to bring attention to their preferred 
issues and to squelch attention to others, effectively prioritizing certain issues for legislative 






which issues will make it to hearings, and what the bills that make it through the committee will 
look like.104  While institutions vary within state legislatures, it is generally accepted that 
committee chairs prioritize certain legislation, influence what bills make it to the floor (and in 
what form), and affect fiscal priorities, among other things.105  In other words, it is generally 
accepted that committee chairs at the state level also have a lot of discretion in setting the 
legislative agenda within their policy domains.     
The literature is clear here: within legislatures there are positions of influence and power 
which exercise a disproportionate degree of control over the legislative agenda.  These positions 
are generally understood to be the majority party leaders and the chairs of committees 
(themselves generally chosen by the majority party leaders).   
Local Government and Agenda control 
While agenda-setting in Congress and state legislatures has been extensively studied, 
there is much less known about how local governments set their agendas.  One notable 
exception, Liu et al. (2010) performed interviews of politicians in three Gulf area localities, in an 
attempt to understand how agenda-setting decisions were made.  Importantly, Liu et al.106 found 
that local political agendas were less likely to be affected by outside actors, such as the media or 
shifting public mood, showing the power of the legislatures themselves in the local legislative 
agenda-setting process.  Their study shows both the importance of examining local-level 
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governance in the context of agenda setting, and the relevance of local political leaders in 
determining the local political agenda.  This chapter seeks to remedy the lack of attention at the 
local level by examining local level legislative agenda setting.   
Descriptive Representation in Positions of Institutional Power 
 Unfortunately for those interested in studying descriptive representation and positions of 
institutional power, these positions are not very diverse.  Racial and ethnic minority 
representatives face a variety of discriminatory institutions and practices, which generally 
preclude them from reaching the higher echelons within Congress107 and state legislatures.108  
For Blacks, the most prominent of these barriers is an anti-Black bias amongst White legislators.  
This bias manifests in multiple ways.  Orey et al.109 provide an overview of this bias and its 
effects. White legislators generally see Black representatives as less effective and see their 
electoral existence as threatening to their own electoral survival.  These biases make Whites less 
likely to support Blacks for leadership positions or prominent committee chairmanships.  And 
this lack of support has led to a general underrepresentation of Blacks in positions of institutional 
agenda-setting power.110  Troublingly, even as Black representation in legislatures across the 
country has continued to rise, there is little evidence that their presence among committee chairs 
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or higher leadership positions has risen.111  For example, between 1989 and 1999, the number of 
committee chairs who were Black (of a sample of roughly 2000 committee chairs) had only risen 
from 115 to 116.112  Historically Blacks have been even more underrepresented in higher 
leadership positions.  For example, in 2016, only three state legislative majority leaders were 
Black (roughly 3%): Chris Holden in the California State Assembly, James Clayborne in the 
Illinois State Senate, and Catherine Pugh in the Maryland State Senate.   
In summary, while Blacks may be seeing their numbers in legislatures around the country 
continue to rise, they have only really entered these bodies at the ground floor.  The barriers to 
rising within the legislatures are still strong, and this makes studying the impact of leadership 
positions more important.  If leadership positions are necessary for the provision of substantive 
representation (through the access to the legislative agenda), and Black representatives are being 
denied access to these positions, we may falsely find that increases in Black representation in 
legislatures does not lead to increased substantive representation at the policy level.   
The underrepresentation of minorities in leadership positions in Congress and state 
legislatures presents a problem for studies of descriptive representation in these positions: there 
are often not enough cases of Black representatives to examine them closely.  This is particularly 
problematic for higher levels of leadership (such as party leaders), as there are fewer positions to 
examine.113  This is probably why there are no studies of the role of descriptive representation 
(for Blacks) among majority party leaders: there have only been a handful of cases where Blacks 
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have reached the pinnacle of legislative power, and only very recently.  The low levels of 
descriptive representation in leadership positions show why switching the level of examination to 
the local level is so important.  There are simply far more cases of descriptive representatives 
holding the head legislative position in local government.  Among 500 city councils examined in 
this project, 56 were led by Black representatives (over 10%), across 24 states.  By utilizing local 
level representation, we can more thoroughly understand the impact leadership positions can 
have on the translation of Black representation into substantive representation across a larger 
scope of contexts.   
  The good news for descriptive representation theories is that there is ample evidence that 
descriptive representatives do seek to get substantive representation issues onto the legislative 
agenda.  Ellis and Wilson114 found that when in positions of institutional power, Black 
representatives used these positions to get substantive representation onto the political agenda.  
Focusing on cases where Blacks were committee or subcommittee chairs, they found that when 
this was true, more hearings were held on minority issues.  Therefore, while Black representation 
among majority leaders and committee chairs is a generally rare phenomenon, there is sufficient 
reason to think that once we see descriptive representatives in these positions, they will use the 
powers associated with these offices to forward substantive representation causes.   
Theory 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how important political incorporation is for 
descriptive representatives to affect policymaking.  Once descriptive representatives are 
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incorporated - what would explain the observed variance in substantive representation?  In this 
section, I build on the findings of Chapter 2 and propose a theory that links descriptive 
representation to substantive representation accounting for both political incorporation and 
leadership positions.  I look closely at the cases when political incorporation is secured, as a 
necessary condition for substantive representation, and argue that two factors will affect the 
outcome: sufficient numbers of descriptive representatives and their control over the legislative 
agenda. 
I treat political incorporation as a necessary condition for substantive representation for 
two reasons. First, as I discussed and found in the previous chapter, descriptive representatives 
who are not incorporated will not be able to affect policy outcomes, as majoritarian voting 
institutions will bar them from passing legislation and affecting policies. Second, when 
considering agenda-setting powers, the role of incorporation becomes more important.  When 
descriptive representatives lack political incorporation, they also lack agenda control, which will 
act as another hard barrier to changing policy. Without the political majority to pass legislation 
and faced with political opposition denying agenda access, descriptive representatives have no 
real ability to change policy.   
Once this necessary condition is met, having sufficient numbers and occupying agenda 
controlling positions will become crucial. I argue, in line with the previous chapter, that 
descriptive representatives will have more voting power as their share in the legislature 
increases, and therefore will be more able to affect policy.  However, this is moderated by the 
ability of descriptive representatives to control the agenda.  If descriptive representatives are 






control, they can find their priorities sidelined for other issues.  In this way, lacking agenda 
control acts as a barrier between translating descriptive representation into substantive 
representation.  Without controlling the legislative agenda, descriptive representatives can see 
their priorities actively denied floor access by hostile political forces, or see their initiatives 
simply sidelined for other priorities of their party.   
The effect of descriptive representatives’ voting power and agenda control will be 
reinforced when both are present in the same legislative situation. While having agenda control 
is beneficial to the provision of substantive representation, it is not sufficient.  Agenda control 
ensures access to the floor, but legislatures still operate as majoritarian institutions when 
deciding whether to pass these initiatives.  Similarly, if the descriptive representatives have 
enough votes, but the things they want to vote on rarely make it to the floor, that diminishes their 
power to affect policy. Therefore, while more voting power will not be as useful if other 
members can keep substantively important policy changes from reaching the floor, neither will 
agenda control be useful if the issues these members bring to the floor get voted down.  This 
means that voting power forms an interactive reinforcing relationship with agenda access. 
Hypothesis 1: When Black representative have agenda control, adding more Black 
representatives will increase substantive representation   
Methodology 
To examine this relationship, I employ the hierarchal linear models specified below, using state 
random effects.    
Poverty Model: Poverty Disparities= Legacy Disparity + State Black Representation + 






Speaker + Black House Rep. + State Professionalism + Black Mayor + South + Black 
Population Share + State Random Effects 
Segregation Model: Poverty Disparities= Legacy Disparity + State Black 
Representation + City Black Representation + Black Speaker + Black House Rep. + 
City Black Representation * Black Speaker + Black House Rep. + State 
Professionalism + Black Mayor + South + White Population Share + White Poverty 
Rate + State Random Effects 
In this section, I will discuss the cases I examine to test my hypothesis, as well as the new 
measures used in this chapter.  I will test my theory on two measures of policy disparities, both 
discussed in the previous chapter: residential segregation and poverty rates.   
I will test my theory using local level legislatures.  I focus on local level legislatures for 
three reasons.  First, there has been extensive study of the relationship of descriptive 
representatives and positions of agenda-setting power at the state and federal level, but very little 
focus in local level legislatures.  Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, local governments 
are an important venue for the provision of substantive representation in policy outcomes as they 
can often tailor policy responses to specific communities in a way higher levels of government 
cannot.  Third, by shifting to the local level, I can expand the number of cases available, 
allowing for a more robust statistical analysis.   
 Having already established the importance of incorporation, I will only examine those 
localities that fit in the definition of political incorporation used in the previous chapter.  To be 
incorporated, these localities need to have a Democratic majority in their city council and exist in 
a state which does not have a unified Republican government.  I subset my data in this way as 
my theory and the findings in my previous chapter show that incorporation is a necessary 
condition for translating descriptive into substantive representation.  This approach allows me to 






incorporation.  Table 3-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the incorporation variable from the 
universe of 500 cases, but recall it is only the cases where incorporation occurs that will be 
included in the models for this chapter.115  By examining only the cases where incorporation 
occurs, this leaves me with 182 cases, out of the 399 cases where I had incorporation data (most 
of this missingness was due to the method used to code local partisanship described in the 
previous chapter).   
Table 3-1: Incorporation of Cities from Universe of Cases 
Variable Total Yes No Missing Mean 
Incorporation 500 182 217 101 0.46 
 
Legislative Agenda Control 
 In order to test my hypothesis, I first need to measure if Black representatives have 
agenda control.  This poses the question: how do you measure agenda control? A comprehensive 
understanding of agenda control would prove incredibly difficult of course.  The agenda is 
controlled by a myriad of different external and internal forces,116 making it nearly impossible to 
definitively say who controls the agenda and how much.  Most studies of legislative agenda-
setting, and particularly those examining who controls floor access, have focused on positions of 
institutional power within the legislature to understand which members have agenda control and 
which do not.  Previous studies at the federal level have benefitted from examining a stable and 
consistent set of institutions that clearly delineate control over floor access to certain members, 
 
115 Note that these statistics presented in this section are slightly different than those from the previous chapter.  
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namely the majority party leadership and committee chairs.117  While focusing on these positions 
of institutional agenda control may miss members who have persuasive or behind the scenes 
power over the agenda, it is useful in that it clearly identifies those who do have some control 
over the agenda.  Nobody denies that the Majority Leader in the Senate or the Speaker of the 
House have immense control over what gets voted on because the rules very clearly give those 
powers to these individuals.   
An institutional examination of agenda control among different subnational units quickly 
runs into an issue of different rules for different legislatures.  Scholars examining agenda control 
at the state level solve this issue by making basic assumptions about legislatures.  In general, 
they assume that the majority party leadership (i.e. positions such as Speakers or Majority 
Leaders), and committee chairs can control the agenda.118  While studies have pointed out there 
is variance in how much control such members have, it is a common practice to accept that those 
in such positions have a large degree of legislative agenda control.  These assumptions are not 
baseless.  Someone has to control the agenda, it being the leaders of such institutions makes 
sense because it is in the interest of the majority to exert unified control of the agenda to achieve 
their collective goals.119   
How does this translate to the local context?  Following previous research, I assume that 
those in leadership positions, namely the head of the local legislature, have control over the 
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legislative agenda.  These leadership positions go by a variety of names: Speaker, President, 
Mayor,120 and Chairman, among others.  For this chapter, I will refer to all of these positions 
collectively as Speakers.   
Many local charters back up the assumption that these members have agenda control, and 
specifically delineate their legislative head as leading their agenda.  For example: 
Section 2 of the Minneapolis local charter lists the duties of the President of the city council.  
The first listed duty is to: 
Have principal supervision over the City Council docket and direct the preparation of an 
agenda for each of its meetings 
Rule 5.2.c of the San Diego local charter lists the duty of the President of the council as 
Manage the docketing process and identify which items should be docketed, placed on the 
consent agenda, or referred to committee. 
Rection 2-60 Rule 3 of the Phoenix local charter lists the rules for setting the agenda during 
policy and work meetings: 
The policy and work study session agendas shall be prepared as follows: 
a. The agenda shall be set by the Mayor, provided that an item may be placed on the 
agenda upon the written request of four Council members. 
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Furthermore, a sample of local charters from Chicago, Tampa, Durham, Kansas City, Orlando, 
and San Francisco all name their speakers the presiding officers over all meetings.   
I focus on head positions rather than committee chairs because the institutional variance 
among local legislatures makes examining committee chairs impossible.  First, many local 
legislatures do not have a committee system, and among those that do there is a staggering 
degree of variance in the number and rules governing these committees.  For example, the city of 
New York (NY) has nearly 40 different committees, while the city of Chicago (IL) only has 
around 20, and Denver (CO) only has 5.  It would be practically impossible to determine which 
members would have agenda control among the various committees across different legislatures 
for any single policy issue.  Moving to the heads of the councils is useful because almost all 
councils have some form of delineated leaders.  Additionally, it is often the heads of legislatures 
that pick which members go on which committees.121  In this way, the agenda control exerted by 
committee heads is influenced by the head of the legislature, minimizing the costs of not 
examining them directly.   
Therefore, I coded agenda control for Black representatives in each city using the race of 
their Speaker.  Speakers of city councils were found using the same methods that were described 
in the previous chapter for regular members, mostly through internet records.  I identified which 
member was the Speaker of the council using the titles for these positions from the following list: 
Speaker, President, Mayor (only if also a voting member of the city council), Chairman, Head, 
Majority Leader, Chief.  Cities were coded as 0 if their Speaker was White and 1 if their Speaker 
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was Black.  Cities that had a Speaker of another race, or who didn’t have a position clearly 
delineated as the head of the legislature were dropped (a total of 30 cases).  Table 3-2 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the Speaker and city council variables. 
Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics for Representation Variables 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Black Speaker 152 0 1 0.11 0.32 
Percent City Council Black 152 0 88.88 15.50 21.49 
 
Other Variables 
In line with the models in my previous chapter, I control for the legacy of disparities, 
having a Black House Rep., and being in the South in both models.  When examining poverty 
disparities, I control for the Black population share in the city.  When examining residential 
segregation, I control for the White population share and the White poverty rate.  Each of these 
variables uses the specification outlined in the previous chapter. 
Table 3-3 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables using the new specifications 











Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics for Relevant Variables 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Poverty Rate Ratio 152 0.22 7.94 2.36 1.17 
Segregation Score 152 0.84 9.20 3.61 1.60 
Legacy Poverty Rate 
Ratio 
152 39.87 20.75 0.77 83.97 
Legacy Segregation 
Score 
152 60.38 25.51 2.51 97.28 
Black House Rep. 152 0 1 0.24 0.15 
South 152 0 1 0.24 0.15 
Black Pop. Share 152 1.06 72.31 11.42 12.85 
White Population 
Share 
152 01.40 89.20 43.86 21.19 
White Poverty Rate 152 0.03 0.33 0.12 0.06 
 
Results 
In the following section, I discuss the results of running the hierarchal linear models.  I 
begin with a short description of the results from both models, and then I will discuss the 
marginal effect and predicted value plots from the segregation interaction.  Table 3-4 shows the 


















Legacy  0.228***  0.164** 
 (0.013) (0.056) 
Percent State Leg. Black -0.199*** -0.0136 
 (0.053) (0.026) 
Percent City Council Black -0.054** -0.123* 
 (0.045) (0.006) 
Black Speaker -10.513***  0.003 
 (2.367) (0.644) 
Black Speaker * Percent City Council 
Black  
 0.176*** -0.005 
 (0.045) (0.011) 
Black House Rep  1.824  0.317 
 (1.763) (0.799) 
State Leg. Professionalism -0.050 -0.004 
 (0.034) (0.007) 
South  0.083 -0.090 
 (0.817) (0.449) 
Black Population Share -  0.828 
 - (1.200) 
White Population Share  77.395*** - 
 (1.664)  
White Poverty Rate  7.604 - 
 (4.254)  
Constant -5.599***  2.223*** 
 (1.752) (0.510) 
 State RE Yes Yes 
N 152 152 
Overall R-Square 0.95 0.21 
* Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The relevance of descriptive representation at the state and local level is very different 






significant negative effect122.  State representation, having a Black Speaker, and the interaction 
effect between Black leadership and Black council share are all insignificant. Thus, I find no 
support for my expectations when examining poverty disparities.  
For residential segregation, however, I find more support for my hypothesis.  I find that 
Black representation at the state and local level and in leadership positions are all significant; 
however, they are all negative.  This means that greater Black representation and having Black 
leadership, on their own, are both associated with more segregation.  The interaction between 
local leadership and local representation, however, is positive, significant, and substantively 
large, as predicted by my theory.  When there is a Black speaker, the impact of each additional 
Black member on the council is significantly associated with lower residential segregation.  This 
effect is quite large: moving from the lowest level of local Black representation to the highest (0 
to 88 percent) leads to an increase in about 11 points in my segregation measure (Black-White 
exposure).  Put in real-world terms, this means the average Black resident lives in a community 
that is 11% more White than one in the city with the lowest representation.  In order to better 
demonstrate this relationship, Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 show the predicted segregation score for 
cities across different levels of Black representation depending on the Black leadership and the 




122 Remember that this variable is interacted with the leadership variable, meaning only when there is no Black 






Figure 3-1: Predicted BW Exposure Score 
 
 
 In Figure 3-1, we can see that when the Speaker is White there is a slight negative effect 
of adding Black representation.  When the Speaker is Black, we see that the segregation score 
starts quite low, but rises rapidly.  The slight negative relationship under White leadership 
indicates that without descriptive leadership, additional Black members lead to worse outcomes, 
perhaps due to a backlash effect.  Furthermore, the low starting positions for the Black speaker 
line indicated that Black leaders without Black members lead to much worse outcomes than 
White leaders without Black members.  It appears that agenda-setting power without the votes to 






hypothesis predicted that Black members would lead to substantive representation when they 
have Black leadership to control the agenda.  The steep and positive sloop of the Black speaker 
line provides strong evidence for this.  It does appear, in the case of residential segregation, that 
the impact of additional Black members is larger when they have Black leadership who can 
remove the agenda setting barriers to floor access.  
Figure 3-2: Marginal Effect of Local Level Representation on BW Exposure Score 
 
 Figure 3-2 shows the marginal effect of adding Black members (relative to the size of the 
council), depending on the presence of Black leadership.  Here again we see a steep positive 
sloop, demonstrating that adding Black members leads to lower disparities, but only when 






In both the poverty and segregation models, I find that the legacy of disparities is 
significant and positive.  This conforms to our understanding of policymaking discussed in the 
previous chapter; specifically, that policy outcomes are sticky over time.  For segregation rates, I 
find a positive and very large effect for the White population share, but this was expected: the 
exposure of Blacks to Whites should go up when there are more Whites in the city.  I found no 
significant effect for state legislative professionalism, being in the South, having a Black House 
Rep., the Black population share, or the White poverty rate, in either model.   
 Overall, these findings are mixed.  I find no significant results in support of my 
hypothesis in the poverty rate model.  In the segregation model, I find significant and strong 
evidence to support my hypothesis.   
Conclusion 
What might explain the mixed results found here?  Furthermore, what might explain the 
negative impact of Black leadership and Black membership on their own? 
I theorized that leadership and voting power, when combined, were beneficial to the 
provision of substantive representation.  I argued that Black members would be more able to 
bring about substantive representation when they had Black leadership to help keep their 
priorities on the agenda.  I also argued that Black leaders would be more able to furnish 
substantive representation when they had other Black members to help their votes pass.  The 
results point towards this relationship being both reinforcing and dependent.  Black leaders 
without Black members and Black members without Black leaders are not only unable to furnish 
substantive representation, but might be associated with worse outcomes.  These findings are 






the acquisition of more seats, or their presence in positions of leadership, but they lack the 
political conditions to effectively alter policy, this power leads to worse outcomes.   
There are many questions this chapter has not answered that will provide fertile ground 
for future studies.  For example, future studies may try to comprehensively consider different 
institutions at the local level.  Different local governmental charters have numerous differences 
regarding bill introduction, committee systems, the integration of partisanship, and mayoral 
powers – all of which could help us better understand where agenda power rests.  For example, 
beyond simply examining agenda-setting power, it might prove important to understand how 
controlling key veto points in the legislative process is important to the provision of substantive 
representation.    Furthermore, this chapter, and this book, has only considered the Black-White 
dyadic relationship.  Trying to understand how other minority groups factor into this story, 
particularly in localities with a large population of non-White non-Black groups, could provide 
new insights.  How might a member of a different minority group in a leadership position 
unlock, or potentially depress, the power of Black representatives?  Finally, there is a lot of 
fertile ground in examining the role of leadership positions for different intersectional groups.  
Are Black male and Black female heads of legislatures equal in how well they translate the 
voting power of Black members?  Do they allocate agenda space to different issues?   
The theory and test presented in this chapter have sought to expand our understanding of 
the conditions under which descriptive representatives can provide substantive representation in 
the lived experience of their constituents.  While chapter 2 examined the partisan context under 
which descriptive representatives win votes, this chapter asked whether they could effectively 






legislature have the same influence over decisions, and historically such positions of power have 
been systematically denied to Black representatives.  Expanding on the existing literature, I 
proposed a theory that accounted for both the partisan context and agenda access as conditions 
for successfully translating descriptive into substantive representation.  I tested this theory by 
examining local legislatures, an under-studied level of government, especially in regards to 
legislative agenda-setting.  I found mixed but promising results.  When examining segregation, I 
found strong evidence supporting the role of Blacks in positions of institutional power as a 
necessary condition for linking descriptive to substantive representation. When Black 
representatives are both present in substantial numbers and occupy leadership positions, they 
maximize their ability to deliver improvements in the policy outcomes, specifically housing 



















CHAPTER 4 : DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AMONG DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 
Introduction 
In 2018 there was a particularly interesting primary for the 16th Prosecutorial District in 
the state of North Carolina.  The district is based primarily in the city of Durham, a liberal 
majority-minority city, and the incumbent District Attorney (DA) Roger Echols was being 
challenged by Satana Deberry.  Deberry, a Black woman, was running on a platform emblematic 
of a new breed of progressive candidates that have come about in the past few years: focused on 
using the discretion afforded the District Attorney’s office, previously used to promote tough on 
crime policies, to advance racial equity in the criminal justice system.  Specifically, she promised 
to shift focus from severely punishing petty crimes, rebuild trust between the criminal justice 
system and the local community, prosecute cases of police misconduct, increase transparency, 
and address racial biases.  Running on a platform of addressing racial biases in this district would 
be surprising to descriptive representation scholars though, as the Police Chief, Senior Trial 
Judge, Chief Public Defender, and the incumbent District Attorney were all Black as well.  With 
this much descriptive representation, scholars might predict that racial equity was already a 
policy focus in the district. However, Deberry firmly positioned herself as the racial justice 
candidate by credibly claiming that the incumbent, while not a staunch opponent to racial equity 
in the criminal justice system, simply hadn’t done enough.  Speaking in an interview, Deberry 






certain way in the system, and the system is racist”.123  Satana is not the only example of a Black 
woman running for District Attorney to address systematic racial inequalities: Aramis Ayala in 
Florida, Kim Foxx in Illinois, and Rachel Rollins in Massachusetts are all members of a 
relatively new cadre of progressive District Attorneys, who, in stark contrast to their primarily 
White and male colleagues, are Black women.  This example begs the question, what role is race 
and gender playing in representation?  Are Black men and Black women systematically different 
when it comes to providing substantive representation?     
 In chapters 2 and 3, I examined the role of constrained descriptive representation in state 
and local legislatures in reducing disparities in 2 policy areas: poverty rates and residential 
segregation.  In this chapter, I will examine a different set of representatives in yet another policy 
area, one inextricably linked to the presence of the two incomparable experiences of White and 
Black America that the Kerner Commission highlighted: the criminal justice system.  Racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system are widely documented, from low-level interactions 
such as traffic stops 124 to capital punishment,125 and the effects of these disparities pervade 
throughout the Black experience in America.  Given the importance of criminal justice 
disparities to racial inequality, these disparities are particularly useful to examine in the lens of 
descriptive representation.  We should expect descriptive representatives to focus their attention 
 
123 Courtesy of Satana Neff, “How Prosecutor Reform Is Shaking Up Small DA Races,” The Marshall Project, May 
2, 2018, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/01/how-prosecutor-reform-is-shaking-up-small-da-races. 
 
124 Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald P. Haider-Markel, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define 
Race and Citizenship (University of Chicago Press, 2014); Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, and Kelsey Shoub, 
Suspect Citizens: What 20 Million Traffic Stops Tell Us About Policing and Race (Cambridge University Press, 
2018). 
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on these disparities, as they represent a quintessential racial issue.126  Furthermore, these 
disparities are highly gendered, providing a uniquely interesting case for examining how male 
and female representatives differ.   
In this chapter, I will examine how District Attorneys can impact disparities in 
incarceration rates. In doing so, I seek to answer the following question: What role does gender 
play in the relationship between substantive and racial descriptive representation?  
To answer this question, I utilize existing theories of intersectional stereotyping to 
develop a theory of intersectional representation.  In this, I argue that Black men and Black 
women have different stereotypes associated with them.  These differing stereotypes lead to 
different expectations about how these individuals may act, and how they can sell themselves to 
voters.  Black men, due to their male identity, will have the opportunity to sell themselves as 
tough on crime District Attorneys.  Black women will not be afforded the same luxury, and 
because of this have historically been excluded from these positions.  However, recent changes 
in the political context have allowed Black women to fill a new niche as progressive changers of 
the status quo. Because of this, Black men, who have primarily entered District Attorney 
positions on tough-on-crime slates will be associated with worse disparities than Black women 
who have entered the field as progressives.  
District Attorneys represent an incredibly compelling case for examining this puzzle 
because of their role in this policy area.  They enjoy broad discretion in the application of their 
powers, which allows them to change the status quo towards or away from racial equity.  District 
 
126 Preuhs, “The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence 






Attorneys have broad prosecutorial discretion to determine who to charge, what crimes to charge 
them with, which plea bargains to offer, and which punishments to seek.  Unlike the legislatures 
studied in my previous chapters, they are an example of an executive position, making 
examining multiple identities much easier.   Furthermore, they are an elected position that has 
seen an interesting trend of Black female candidates specifically seeking racial justice in recent 
years.   
In this chapter, I employ two separate tests of my theory.  First, I do a small and focused 
examination of District Attorneys in North Carolina, examining data from the Administrative 
Office of the Courts to see who is getting sent to prison.  In this test, I can test how changing the 
race and gender of the District Attorney changes disparities in incarceration rates within the same 
district.  I then use a novel dataset covering almost 600 District Attorneys, in conjunction with 
data from the Census, the Vera Institute, and the Women Donor’s Network, to do a broader 
cross-sectional examination of District Attorneys across the US.  In line with my expectations, I 
find compelling evidence that descriptive representation does operate across race and gender.  
While incarceration is primarily an issue affecting Black men, these incarceration disparities are 
reduced most by Black female District Attorneys.   
Literature Review 
Disparities in the Criminal Justice System 
 There is a renewed public interest in racial disparities in the criminal justice system after 
a series of high-profile police shootings of unarmed Black men in recent years.  This interest has 
been marked by a series of demonstrations, both peaceful and otherwise, but the disparities 






documented how “commonly sparked by repressive and violent police actions, urban uprisings 
were political acts of self-defense and racial liberation on a mass, public scale. Legislative 
successes at the federal level with the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts were not reflected in 
the daily lives of African-Americans facing police misconduct, economic inequality, segregated 
housing, and inferior educations.”  Over 60 years ago, Americans were discussing how racial 
disparities, and the lack of concrete action to combat them, was a severe problem in America.  
We have not sufficiently addressed this question even today.   
Racial disparities in the modern criminal justice system, particularly those 
disadvantageous to Blacks, are severe and well documented.  Studies have shown that Blacks are 
more likely to face increased scrutiny and be searched in low-level police interactions,127 more 
likely to receive harsher punishments from judges,128 and more likely to receive the death 
penalty in capital cases.129  The criminal code is sometimes intentionally used to target African 
American communities.  For example, sentences for possession of crack, a drug more commonly 
used by Blacks, are much higher than sentences for possession of cocaine, a drug more 
commonly used by more affluent Whites.  In addition to high-level drug sentencing decisions, 
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investigations have shown that Blacks, in some cities such as Ferguson, are specifically targeted 
for low-level infractions as a revenue source.130   
In this chapter, I will focus on one of the most far-reaching and consequential criminal 
justice disparities: Blacks are more likely than Whites to be incarcerated.131  This disparity 
largely stems from two facts: Blacks are more likely to be convicted of crimes and to receive 
harsher sentencing for those crimes.132  While incarceration disparities have existed in the 
American criminal justice system since its invention, modern disparities are far worse, due to 
intentional political decisions.  Starting around the 1990s, an emphasis on being “Tough on 
Crime” lead to policies that would jump-start the mass incarceration system we have today.133  
For example, mandatory minimum sentencing laws and drug criminalization has led to a 
ballooning prison population that is increasingly comprised of racial and ethnic minorities.134 
Because policy decisions largely cause these disparities, it is within the realm of politics and 
descriptive representation to change them.     
 
130 Department of Justice, “Justice Department Announces Findings of Two Civil Rights Investigations in Ferguson, 
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The Far-Reaching Consequences of the Mass Incarceration System 
Disparities in the criminal justice system have severe consequences for those 
incarcerated, and have spillover effects for their communities.  Far beyond being a limitation on 
one’s liberty, incarceration has broader short-term implications and long-term consequences for 
individuals, assuming they ever leave prison (something less likely due to the advent of life 
without parole sentencing). While incarcerated, individuals are forced to work for no pay (some 
states do pay prisoners, but generally for pennies an hour),135 typically have poor access to 
healthcare,136 and have little to no contact with their friends or family.  Once incarcerated 
individuals leave prison their trials and tribulations are not over.  They face restrictions to their 
voting rights and other barriers to civic participation,137 worse health prospects,138 employment 
barriers,139 and an increased likelihood of going back to prison.140  This creates a system where 
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once a person is incarcerated, they are very unlikely to ever fully reenter society, even after their 
“debt to society” has nominally been paid.  In many ways, the incarcerated are treated as one of 
the few de jure141 second class citizens in modern America, and this classification follows the 
incarcerated for the rest of their lives.     
The plight of incarceration is not only felt by those that are incarcerated, but extends into 
their social circles and communities.  Families of the incarcerated are less likely to vote,142 face 
stymied intergenerational social and economic mobility,143 as well as the need to deal with the 
emotional toll of being separated from a loved one.  These are spouses, children, and friends who 
are left to pick up the pieces when someone is removed from society.  These are spouses, 
children, and friends who are paying the price of the mass incarceration system.  These 
disparities go farther than the immediate family and social circle of the individual.  Communities 
with high incarceration rates face a variety of public health problems,144 entrenched segregation 
 
141 In fact, they are the only group of people who are legally allowed to be enslaved due to a clause in the 13th 
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and poverty,145 a higher crime rate, and lowered prospects for community youth.146  The racial 
disparities in criminal justice cannot be thought of as only affecting those incarcerated; the mass 
incarceration system reverberates through the Black community, perpetuating systemic injustice 
through time.   
Mass Incarceration and Gender 
 It is impossible to thoroughly discuss the mass incarceration system without a discussion 
of its differential impact on gender.  The criminal justice system does not impact men and 
women in the same way.  In many ways, Black men are more directly affected by criminal 
justice disparities than Black women are, because Black men are more likely to interact with the 
criminal justice system directly.  Scholars have noted that Black men are more associated with 
memes of suspicion,147 which leads to more hostile treatment by the police and tougher 
sentencing from judges,148 and a much higher chance to be incarcerated than Black women.149  
While the rate for female imprisonment is rising, and Black women are more likely to be in 
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prison than White women, only about 6% of the incarcerated population is female.150  Due to this 
higher likelihood of being incarcerated, Black men are more likely to face a variety of social151 
and economic152 challenges that arise from incarceration. 
 However, other scholars have noted that Black women still face challenges due to the 
mass incarceration of Black men, just in a different manner.  When a Black man is incarcerated, 
it is essential to note they often leave a family behind.  Partners of the incarcerated face a variety 
of stressors, such as uncertainty about their loved one's well‐being, deterioration of family 
functioning, stigma, and social isolation.153  Furthermore, they must shoulder the economic 
weight of providing for the familial unit,154 as well as providing for the prisoners inside (be it 
through money for the commissary, or paying for calling privileges, etc.).  These disparities 
extend beyond social and economic factors: it has been noted that higher incarceration rates for 
Black men are also tied to higher health disparities for Black women, specifically regarding 
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sexually transmitted diseases,155 prenatal care,156 and substance abuse.157  In many ways, while 
Black men are being put in prison, Black women are left behind to pick up the pieces, 
demonstrating both the value of an intersectional approach to criminal justice disparities, and 
how disturbing are the realities of the mass incarceration state.  The different experiences for 
Black men and Black women in this context should have implications for our expectations of 
how Black representatives of different genders will act in this policy domain.   
Descriptive Representation and Incarceration 
It is important to remember that the mass incarceration of Americans, specifically Black 
Americans, is not an accident; it is the outcome of intentional political decisions.  Scholars have 
documented the deliberate decisions made in the post-civil rights era to target the criminal justice 
system towards Blacks.158  For example, in her book The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander 
expertly demonstrates how, in an effort to maintain the racial hierarchy, the criminal justice 
system became a de facto method of preserving the racial hierarchy in an era where de jure 
policies were no longer possible.  Many point to high profile policies from the “Tough on 
Crime” era, such as mandatory minimum sentencing laws and the Three Strikes law, as examples 
 
155 O. A. Grinstead et al., “HIV, STD, and Hepatitis Risk to Primary Female Partners of Men Being Released from 
Prison,” Women & Health 41, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 63–80, https://doi.org/10.1300/J013v41N02_05. 
 
156 Lauren Dyer et al., “Mass Incarceration and Public Health: The Association between Black Jail Incarceration and 
Adverse Birth Outcomes among Black Women in Louisiana,” BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth; London 19 (2019): 
1–10, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1186/s12884-019-2690-z; Jaquelyn L. Jahn et al., “County-Level Jail 
Incarceration and Preterm Birth among Non-Hispanic Black and White U.S. Women, 1999–2015,” Social Science & 
Medicine 250 (April 1, 2020): 112856, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.112856. 
 
157 Bruns and Lee, “Partner Incarceration and Women’s Substance Use”; Christopher Wildeman, Hedwig Lee, and 
Megan Comfort, “A New Vulnerable Population? The Health of Female Partners of Men Recently Released from 
Prison,” Women’s Health Issues 23, no. 6 (November 1, 2013): e335–40, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.whi.2013.07.006. 
 
158 Alexander, The New Jim Crow; Amanda Nicholson Bergold et al., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at Racial 







of policies that have contributed to the mass incarceration state, and with it, the massive racial 
disparities in incarceration.   
However, the institutional nature of incarceration disparities leaves room for reform.  The 
policies that create these disparities can be repealed or replaced with new ones that seek to 
address systemic inequalities.  As in other chapters of this book, I will examine the role that a 
representative’s race plays in the reduction of racial disparities.  And there is good reason to 
think that descriptive representatives should play a key role in initiating these reforms.  Scholars 
have noted that policy area is important when considering how relevant descriptive 
representation is in providing substantive representation.159  They posit that racialized policy 
issues, an issue where racial cleavages dominate the political context such as the criminal justice 
system or welfare,160 highlight the racial experience of different representatives and reduce the 
relative importance of partisanship while increasing the importance of a representative’s race.  
Scholarship has shown promising results in this vein, finding that Black legislators play an 
instrumental role in determining the appetite for racial policy reform in Democratic 
legislatures.161   
There are several high-profile cases of Black representatives using their positions to push 
for ending mass incarceration.  Senator Cory Booker authored and helped pass the First Step Act, 
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which sought to reduce the federal prison population, and the Fair Chance Act, which sought to 
reduce employment discrimination for the previously incarcerated.  During the Democratic 
primary in 2020, former Senator and Vice-President Kamala Harris included ending solitary 
confinement, ending private prisons, and eliminating mandatory minimums in her platform.  At 
the state level, State Senator Elgie Simms Jr., a Democrat in Illinois, helped call for a joint 
session to address racial disparities in incarceration and has called for sweeping reforms on the 
subject.  His colleague State Senate Majority Leader and Black Caucus Chair Kimberly 
Lightford said, after proposing criminal justice legislation, “This is the moment that I have 
dreamed of, that I have prayed for, that I have worked towards my entire life”.162 
District Attorneys 
In previous chapters, I have focused on the role that state and local representatives play in 
shaping policy to reduce disparities, as in the examples above.  However, in this chapter, I will 
focus on a different set of public officials, those who prosecute legal proceedings for state 
governments.  In particular, I will focus on the positions of chief prosecutors for the judicial 
districts within state governments.   There are approximately 2,300 judicial districts in the United 
States, prosecuting over 2.3 million felony cases per year,163 and within each is a team of 
prosecutors that represent that state, headed by a chief prosecutor (the federal equivalent would 
be a United States Attorney).  While it varies based on the state, these jurisdictions are generally 
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designed around existing county jurisdictions, with less populated counties being grouped 
together into larger geographic judicial districts.  In North Carolina, there are 42 such districts 
(called prosecutorial districts), shown in figure 4-1, built from the 100 counties in North Carolina 
shown in figure 4-2.  Despite the grouping of smaller counties, there is a wide variance in the 
underlying population size of these districts.  For example, the smallest district in NC, district 7, 
comprises only about 35,000 people, whereas the largest district, district 33, comprises over 
700,000 people.164   















Figure 4-2: Map of NC Counties 
 
 These lead positions in these districts go by various titles across the country, from 
Commonwealth’s Attorney to Solicitor, and they are essential to creating or potentially 
reforming incarceration disparities.  In this chapter, I will refer to all of these chief prosecutor 
positions collectively as District Attorneys.   
District Attorneys and Elections 
District Attorneys were originally appointed, but in the early 19th century there was a 
very successful push to make these officials popularly elected.165  Today, in every state except 
Alaska, New Jersey, and Connecticut, District Attorneys are popularly elected.  The average 
District Attorney has extensive experience as a prosecutor, often starting as an assistant 
prosecutor in the district they come to run.166 However, the vast majority of these seats go 
 
165 Michael J Ellis, “The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor,” THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2012, 43. 
 
166 Ronald F. Wright, “Beyond Prosecutor Elections The 2014 SMU Criminal Justice Colloquium,” SMU Law 







uncontested in their elections.167,168  For example, the Justice for All project examined every 
election in the 2014 cycle and found that over 85% of District Attorneys ran unopposed in their 
general elections.  Electoral competition is not much better when primaries are factored in; 
roughly 80% of all incumbents run unopposed in both their primary and general elections.169  
Even when opposed, there is some evidence that District Attorneys are quite difficult to 
unseat.170  This means that while many of these positions are nominally elected, like many other 
local positions, officials tend to stay in office once elected until they retire, and face little serious 
electoral competition.   
This might lead one to believe that elections do not affect District Attorneys, as they do 
not generally face credible electoral threats.  However, scholars have demonstrated that elections 
still impact the behavior of prosecutors, generally leading prosecutors to be more “tough on 
crime”.171  One consistent finding is that during election years, prosecutors seek to increase their 
conviction rate in order to demonstrate to voters that they are doing a good job.172  The use of 
incarceration rates shouldn’t be surprising; the chief job of District Attorneys is to prosecute 
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cases, leaving voters few alternative measures to gauge their performance.173  Coupled with the 
general public’s appetite for “tough on crime” politics, this leads to a general re-election strategy 
for sitting prosecutors to seek high conviction rates.  We can see this re-election strategy in 
practice when prosecutors do face challenges and need to campaign.  In these campaigns, the 
conviction rate metric is paramount to their re-election strategy, with little focus on the quality of 
these convictions.174  This quantity over quality approach and the generally “hawkish” behavior 
before elections results in “inaccurate sentences, wrongful convictions, and, consequently, 
successful appeals of their cases”.175  
If District Attorneys do not face credible electoral threats, why do elections affect their 
behavior?  One reason is that much of the electoral safety that District Attorney’s enjoy is due to 
the lack of credible challengers to their elections, and District Attorneys use their time in office 
shoring up their electoral prospects to head off any prospective challengers.176  This power to 
head off challengers is exacerbated by the unique situation that prospective challengers face.  As 
most credible challengers are themselves prosecutors of a lower rank, and often work in the same 
office as the current District Attorney, an unsuccessful bid to unseat the sitting DA will often 
mean jeopardizing one’s current employment.177  The high cost of an unsuccessful challenge 
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means that serious challengers will only enter races that they think they have a good chance of 
winning, and if a sitting DA sticks to tried and true “tough on crime” strategies, this chance may 
never come up.  The high cost of failure means that given the opportunity, we should expect 
potential candidates to adopt tried and true strategies, however, I will discuss later how certain 
individuals may not be able to credible adopt such a strategy due to the stereotypical 
expectations associated with their identity.    
Taken together, the popular election of District Attorneys traditionally leads prosecutors 
to focus on incarcerating lots of individuals to sell their performance to the public, despite the 
fact that they generally face little to no real electoral threats.  And unfortunately, this focus leads 
to predictably unjust results.  However, those who may be precluded from adopting a tough-on-
crime stance will have to adopt a different strategy to succeed.  I will discuss in my theory 
section how Black women have thrived outside of the traditional tough-on-crime trope due to a 
changing political context. 
The Powers of the District Attorney 
While the specific duties of District Attorneys change depending on which state you 
examine, they are generally in charge of deciding whether to charge someone with a crime, what 
crime to charge someone with, determining plea deals, and depending on state laws, whether to 
seek the death penalty.  Through these powers, District Attorneys have a large degree of 
discretion in determining how many people end up in prison and for how long.178  It cannot be 
understated how vital these different powers are in shaping incarceration in the United States.   
 








When a potential crime has been committed, the District Attorney first determines if 
charges should be made.  But more important than the dichotomous decision on whether to 
charge or not, they decide on precisely which crimes to charge an accused individual.  A drug 
charge could be accompanied by wanton endangerment, intent to sell/distribute, or a variety of 
other charges, extending the sentence with each additional charge.  For example, Eliel Avelar 
was accused of murder in Illinois, and was charged with armed robbery as a Level 3 felony; auto 
theft as a Level 6 felony; three separate counts of obstruction of justice as Level 6 felonies; 
intimidation as a Level 6 felony and unlawful possession of a firearm by an alien.   The charging 
power carries with it a heavy influence on sentencing, as the crimes you are charged with carry 
different sentences.  For example, after the fatal shooting of Breonna Taylor in Kentucky, the 
Attorney General decided to charge one of the officers involved with wanton endangerment, 
which carries a sentence of 5 years, instead of a more severe charge such as manslaughter, which 
carries a sentence of 10-20 year.  A District Attorney can choose to “throw the book” at an 
individual and charge them with every possible charge in order to lengthen their sentence.   
Plea Bargaining 
This charging power also carries with it significant leverage in plea bargaining.179  Plea 
bargaining is the negotiations surrounding an arrangement between a prosecutor and a defendant, 
whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser charge in the expectation of a less severe 
sentence.  For example, Eliel Avelar eventually accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to voluntary 
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manslaughter to avoid the slew of charges initially brought against him.  Plea bargaining is a 
monolithic fixture of the criminal justice system used in an estimated 90-95 percent of criminal 
cases,180,181 making it an essential piece of the incarceration puzzle.182   
It is best to understand plea deals as having two stages.  In stage 1, the District Attorney 
chooses what to charge an individual with, creating the starting point from which the bargaining 
will begin.  District Attorneys are primarily concerned with two things at this stage, maximizing 
the sentence, and minimizing the chance of a lengthy trial that could end in no conviction.183  
This starting point is critical in shaping the likelihood a plea is accepted184 and what the final 
sentence will be: the worse the original charges are, the more likely a defendant is to accept a 
plea, and the higher the sentence a defendant will accept.185  This creates an incentive for District 
Attorneys to “overcharge” a defendant, creating what is commonly referred to as the “trial 
penalty.”  The “trial penalty” is the added charges (and therefore added punishment) a defendant 
will face if they refuse a plea deal and take their chances at trial.  This leaves defendants with 
two choices: go to trial where you face a slew of serious charges, or take the plea deal with a 
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much shorter sentence.  Many defendants, including those who are innocent of all their charges, 
can feel pressured to take a plea deal to avoid this “trial penalty”, leading them to accept plea 
deals that include serious prison sentences instead.  In certain states, District Attorneys have the 
ability to seek the death penalty to pressure defendants to take a plea deal, forcing defendants in 
this situation to literally choose between life and death.  Taken together, the power to charge, 
sentence, and plea bargain ensures that every incarcerated person’s186 sentence was affected by 
the choices of a District Attorney.    
Discretion and Disparities 
This discretion makes District Attorneys uniquely suited to exacerbate or mitigate racial 
disparities in incarceration rates, and highlights the importance of their implicit or explicit racial 
attitudes.  Through racial biases, District Attorneys could focus their efforts on Blacks and 
increase their district's racial disparities.  And there is reason to think that District Attorneys are 
focusing their attentions on Blacks. Scholars have shown that Blacks tend to be perceived as 
more threatening than Whites.187 Also, they have shown these perceptions of threat can 
contribute to longer sentences.188  The role of racial animus in criminal justice decisions has 
played out in several cases.   For example, Frances Choy, a 17-year-old Asian American, spent 
nine years in prison before a Superior Court judge threw her conviction out after evidence that 
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racial animus on the part of the District Attorney played a role in her conviction.189  Marcus 
Robinson was granted clemency from his death sentence by the North Carolina Supreme Court 
after they found the decision to seek death in his case was made partially due to his race.190 
However, a District Attorney who is cognizant of racial disparities could focus their 
energy on the equal application of the law.  For example, George Gascon, the District Attorney 
for San Francisco, intends to initiate a program where prosecutors would make charging 
decisions without know the defendant’s race.191  Rachel Rollins, Suffolk County District 
Attorney, ran for election citing 15 different charges her office wouldn’t prosecute, seeking to 
keep those accused of these crimes out of prison.  Marilyn Mosby, the DA in Baltimore, MD, has 
recently announced that her office will no longer prosecute prostitution, drug possession, and 
other low-level offenses.192,193  District Attorneys can also retry or drop charges during the 
appeal in cases where racial biases played a role in a conviction.  In this way, a District Attorney 
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not only affects incarceration rates in the future, but can potentially impact incarceration rates 
deriving from before their tenure.   
Descriptive Representation among District Attorneys 
Unfortunately for descriptive representation scholars interested in District Attorneys, 
there have historically been very few District Attorneys who were people of color.  And it is hard 
to study descriptive representatives when there are none.  While there are high profile cases of 
people of color seeking District Attorney positions and winning them, the vast majority are still 
held by Whites, and specifically, by White men.  Between 2014 and 2020, only about 3% of 
District Attorneys were Black, and 79% were White men.  While comprehensive statistics from 
before this period are hard to find, there is some evidence that modern levels of descriptive 
representation are higher than in the past.  Many of the roughly 70 positions held by Blacks in 
the 2014-2020 period were positions that had never been held by a person of color before.  Jackie 
Lacey, the District Attorney in Los Angeles, elected in 2012, was the first Black District 
Attorney for that office.  Michael Jackson, District Attorney for Selma AL, elected in 2004, was 
the first African American elected to that position, and the second for the entire state of 
Alabama.  Aramis Ayala, the District Attorney in Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit elected in 
2016, was the state’s first Black District Attorney.  While District Attorneys are still 
overwhelmingly White and male, we are seeing some of the positions beginning to be filled by 










Figure 4-3: Black District Attorneys in 2020 
 
Similar to other elected positions, Black men and Black women are not equally 
represented among District Attorneys, nor was their inclusion simultaneous.  While firm data on 
the race and gender composition of District Attorneys in the past is hard to come by, I collected 
information regarding the race and gender of District Attorneys in 2014 and again in 2020.  
There is a general trend that Black men became District Attorneys earlier than Black women.  
Whereas Black men have been a small minority of District Attorneys since the late 2000s, Black 
women have only seen their numbers grow since the late 2010s.  Black men encompassed 40 
District Attorneys in 2014 and numbered only 32 in 2020.  Black women, by comparison, went 
from 14 seats to over 30.  Furthermore, of the 14 Black women serving in 2014, most were 
serving their first term.  In the theory section, I will discuss how the entrance of Black men and 
Black women into this position during different periods creates a difference between Black male 







Substantive Representation among Descriptive District Attorneys 
Among the relatively few minority District Attorneys, there is good reason to believe that 
they are seeking to reform the criminal justice system, and that their race is an important factor in 
the decision. For example, following the mass protests after the shooting of George Floyd, 
Rachael Rollins, District Attorney of Suffolk, held a press conference.  In it, she described how a 
“burning rage… in my voice is real” and how “we (the Black community) have been telling you 
(the White community) forever” in reference to police brutality targeted at Blacks.195  What is 
telling here is that this District Attorney is clearly referencing her membership in the racial 
minority group in her response after mass demonstrations, and particularly, referencing how her 
experience and feelings as a member of that group have shaped her reaction.  Satana Deberry, the 
notably progressive District Attorney in Durham NC, has said that her experience as a Black 
woman has heavily influenced her decisions to implement criminal justice reforms.196  In an 
interview, she said, “As a Black person, I have lots of personal experiences with racism,” and 
even though she enjoys many privileges through education and position, “still [her] children are 
not safe” due to systemic racism.197  It is clear that in both examples, their experience as Black 
persons in America has affected how they react to racialized issues in the criminal justice system.   
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While most District Attorneys see “tough on crime” policies as being essential to their 
political survival, many of these progressive DAs have broken this mold and use their racial 
justice policies to sell themselves to voters.  For example, Rachel Rollins’ campaign website 
said: 
“As District Attorney, Rachael Rollins will put in place fair, transparent policies 
to keep residents safe and provide justice for victims. Everyone that comes into contact 
with her Office will be treated with dignity and respect. She will improve our criminal 
justice system through best-practice, data-driven programs that prioritize equity and 
justice. The communities that make up Suffolk County will be partners in the process of 
transforming the District Attorney’s Office. The Office will reflect and benefit from the 
rich diversity of Suffolk County”.198 
Satana Deberry’s campaign listed racial justice as their third priority on their platform 
page, saying:  
“No matter who has been the District Attorney in Durham County or what 
programs have been implemented, we have the same criminal justice outcomes we had 50 
years ago.  That means the District Attorney continues to over-prosecute people based on 
race and socioeconomic status.  In addition to being overcrowded, the jail is 
disproportionately filled with black people.  Black people, who make up only 38 percent 
of Durham’s population, make up 80 percent of the people in jail.  Satana will prioritize 
working with the courts and Sheriff’s Office to drastically decrease the daily census 
 







count at the jail.  Satana will also ensure that there is fairness in the prosecutorial 
decision-making process by requiring routine implicit bias training for prosecutors; 
routine review of data to expose and address racial inequity; and the incorporation of 
racial impact review in performance review for individual prosecutors. Satana will work 
with community partners to create meaningful guidance to prosecutors on reducing the 
impact of implicit bias in prosecution”.199 
For her re-election campaign, Kimberly Gardner has listed the following as an 
accomplishment: 
“Kim has made jail and prison a last resort, reserved for those who pose a true 
public safety risk, not for individuals who commit petty offenses, suffer from addiction or 
mental illness, or are too poor to post bond.”200 
These three cases are emblematic of the new progressive District Attorney campaign 
pitch: instead of selling their performance using incarceration rates, they are selling to the voters 
their moves to enact racial justice.  However, despite their electoral successes, there has been 
substantial backlash against these attempts to reconceptualize the role of the DA.   
For example, Kimberly Davis filed suit in federal courts in 2020, alleging a “racially 
motivated conspiracy to deny the civil rights of racial minorities” for what she claimed were the 
city administration and police’s efforts to derail her racial justice policies and oust her from 
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office.201   She went on to say that “This is also about the continuing attacks on progressive 
prosecutors, not just in St. Louis, but around this country”.202 
Rachel Rollins has had an ongoing feud with her local police department.  The Boston 
Police Patrolmen's Association in a press release on Twitter accused Rollins of having 
“undoubtedly incited violence against the proud men and women of the Boston Police 
Department”.  Kimberly Foxx has also faced similar criticisms from local police, who said 
“Criminals took to the street with the confidence that there would be no consequences for their 
actions” due in part to her decisions to not charge some protestors following the George Floyd 
shooting.203 
The pattern is clear: other actors in the criminal justice system are having a reactionary 
response to these revolutionary changes.    And these responses serve as a warning to DAs who 
might consider racial justice reforms and are meant to dissuade them from doing so.  Therefore, 
if you choose to pursue racial justice reform, you need to be prepared to run against your 
opponent and the police in your election.  These reactions create a high degree of uncertainty for 
potentially progressive District Attorneys, as well as a strong barrier to their success.  Why then 
would an individual adopt such a stance?  I will argue that some individuals, due to their identity, 
will lack the ability to credibly claim allegiance to tough-on-crime policies, and will have to 
adopt a different strategy in order to succeed.  One such strategy is the one being used by the 
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District Attorney’s discussed in this chapter.  By changing the paradigm away from high 
incarceration rates and towards racial justice, some District Attorneys are able to survive in 
office without the support of institutions such as the police. 
Race, Gender, and Stereotyping 
In this chapter, I will examine how the stereotypes surrounding a descriptive 
representative’s identity shape the expectations of their actions and affect how they will act once 
in office.  I follow existing research in arguing that different identities have different stereotypes 
associated with them.  These stereotypes are linked to race and gender in an intersectional 
framework.  However, individuals who share some identities with the dominant group tend to 
have those identities emphasized.  Black male representative share one identity with the 
dominant group (their gender) and because of that can credibly commit to the status quo, and 
therefore can and will run on a tough-on-crime slate.  Black women, however, are not afforded 
the same luxury.  Lacking any shared identities with the dominant group, and facing negative 
stereotypes that run contrary to the goals of the criminal justice system, they will not have the 
opportunity to credibly claim they are tough-on-crime in the aggregate.  As such, Black women 
will rely on alternate strategies to electoral success, namely running on platforms of racial justice 
reform.    
The process of stereotyping, or the forming of beliefs about an individual based solely on 
their identities, has been extensively studied.  Stereotypes are not all the same, however: some 
can be positive, like being seen as hard working, some can be negative, such as being lazy.  
Scholars have noted that stereotypes are assigned to racial and gender identities in a hierarchal 






be assigned positive stereotypes, and subordinate groups, Blacks (or other non-White groups) for 
race/ethnicity, and women for gender, tend to be associated with more negative stereotypes.   
Specifically, Whites are generally associated with industriousness, a good work ethic, and strong 
morals, whereas Blacks tend to be associated with criminality, lack of education, and a lack of 
professionalism204.  Furthermore, men tend to be associated with toughness, agency, and 
aggressiveness, and women with passivity, nurturing, and emotionality205.  I will argue that the 
stereotypes associated with being Black and being female are seen as incompatible with working 
in the criminal justice system that promotes the “tough on crime” agenda.  The association of 
Blacks with criminality will make voters concerned that Blacks as District Attorneys will not be 
tough-on-crime.  In a similar vein, the passive and motherly natures attributed to women will 
raise concerns that female District Attorneys will not be aggressive enough against crime.  In this 
way, individuals who have these identities will find it difficult to signal their allegiance to the 
status quo, and effectively use a tough-on-crime stance in their elections.   
Intersectionality and Stereotyping 
Intersectionality scholars have found that the application of different stereotypes across race and 
gender lines is not as neat as adding up the stereotypes of all your constituent identities.  
Importantly, there is evidence that those who possess some dominant group identities and some 
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identities of subordinate groups are more readily identified with their dominant group 
identities206.  Put another way, Black men are more likely identified by others as men than as 
Black, and White women are more likely identified as being White than as being women.  In this 
way, groups with some dominant group identities tend to have fewer negative stereotypes 
associated with them than those without any dominant group identities.  I call this process 
dominant group identity shifting, where the intersectional identity of an individual tends to be 
shifted towards their dominant group identities and away from their subordinate group identities.  
I will argue that this process of dominant group identity shifting will lead to different expectation 
for how Black men and Black women will act once in office. 
Theory 
I propose a theory of stereotyped descriptive representation.  In this theory, descriptive 
representatives of different sub-identities can have different stereotypes associated with their 
intersectional identities.  Part of these different expectations is the process of dominant group 
identity shifting, a process by which those who have some identities of dominant groups will be 
expected to act in line with those identities rather than their subordinate identities.  These 
stereotypes in turn produce a set of expectation about how these individuals will act once in 
office, which affect the electoral strategies available to a representative.    
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 In the context of District Attorneys, we can note that dominant group identities (being 
White and male) tend to be helpful for prospective candidates, and subordinate identities tend to 
be negative.  However, importantly, these identities also affect the expectations of how tough-on-
crime an individual will be.  Black candidates will be perceived as unlikely to maintain a status 
quo so disadvantageous to their racial group.  Male candidates can signal their toughness, as well 
as their role as disciplinarians207.  While both Black male and Black female candidates face the 
racial stereotype, Black men can fall back on their male identity to signal their allegiance to 
tough-on-crime policies.  Black women, however, are not afforded this luxury.  Black women are 
often perceived as nurturing and compassionate, and these stereotypes are generally incompatible 
with tough-on-crime policies.  As such, working within the system to achieve electoral success 
(by working with the police and maintaining a high incarceration rate) will not be available to 
them.  Therefore, if Black women are to succeed in this field, it will require an alternate strategy, 
one that doesn’t require the cooperation of the police, namely a strategy of progressive racial 
justice reform.   
High profile cases of Black female District Attorneys demonstrate how powerful and 
successful this strategy can be in the right political context.  District Attorneys like 
Satana Deberry not only can succeed without police support, they can use the lack of 
support from police as a signal they are doing their job.  In this way, by being precluded 
from office on a tough-on-crime slate, Black female District Attorneys are more likely to 
affect racial justice reforms, as these reforms become the basis of their re-election pitch.  
 
207 Amy L. DeWitt, Cynthia M. Cready, and Rudy Ray Seward, “Parental Role Portrayals in Twentieth Century 







Instead of signaling their job performance by using high incarceration rates, these District 
Attorneys use metrics of racial disparities.  This leads me to my main hypothesis.  H1: 
Black women will reduce racial disparities in incarceration rates more than Black men. 
For empirical analysis, I first conduct a case study of District Attorneys in North 
Carolina. Using detailed data on convictions, I present some preliminary observations on the 
potential effects that a change from a White to a non-White DA may have on incarceration 
outcomes. I then discuss the methodology of the cross-sectional nationwide analysis, which I 
will use to test the proposed theory. 
North Carolina Case Study 
 I will begin testing my expectations with a case study of District Attorneys in the state of 
North Carolina.  North Carolina was chosen because there are unique data available to the state, 
which tracks each individual that goes through the state court system, recording the details of the 
conviction.  These data, furnished by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AoC), allows me 
to examine the incarceration patterns in each prosecutorial district on a year-by-year basis.  I use 
this panel data for each district to examine how the incarceration patterns change when the 
District Attorney changes, in particular when the race and/or gender of the District Attorney 
changes.   
Incarceration Data 
 The AoC data is available from 2015 to 2019 and includes for each county: the race for 
each individual that was entered into the court system, what they were charged with, arraigned 
on, and convicted of.  I use these data to create a county-wide count for each racial group, of 






district is comprised of a set of counties, so I then aggregate the county-wide scores up to the 
prosecutorial district.  I combined these yearly counts to create a by-district incarceration rate for 
each year.   
However, not all crimes are alike; some are more serious than others.  And it might be the 
case that descriptive representatives have less discretion in very serious crimes. Therefore, I 
consider high degree felonies separately. In North Carolina, all felonies individuals are charged 
with are ranked by severity using a class, from A to I.  Table 4-1 shows each felony class, 
examples of eligible crimes, and the corresponding sentence length.  I collapse the various codes 
an individual could be convicted of into two tiers. The first tier, consisting of A through F 
classed felonies, primarily deals with violent crimes, ranging from murder to assault.  The 
second tier, consisting of all felonies between G, H, and I codes, are primarily drug offenses.  I 
divide these district-wide yearly counts by the age 15-64 population (for the relevant race) to 

















Table 4-1: NC Felonies codes 
 Example Crimes Maximum Sentence 
A First-Degree Murder Death or Life Without Parole 
B  Second-Degree murder, 
First-Degree Forcible Rape 
Life Without Parole 
C Second-Degree Forcible 
Rape, Second-Degree 
Forcible Sexual Offense 
 
231 Months 
D Voluntary Manslaughter, 
First-Degree Burglary 
204 Months 
E Sexual Activity by a 
Substitute Parent or 
Custodian, Discharging 
Weapon Into Occupied 
Property 
88 Months 
F Involuntary Manslaughter, 
Assault Inflicting Serious 
Bodily Injury 
59 Months 
G Sale of a Schedule I or II 
Controlled Substance, 
Common Law Robbery 
47 Months 
H Sale of a Schedule III, IV, V, 
or VI Controlled Substance, 
Possessing Stolen Goods  
39 Months  
I Possession W/I/M/S/D 
Marijuana, Financial 
Transaction Card Theft 
 24 Months 
 
Figure 4-4 shows the average conviction rate across all districts over time.  We can see 
there are more G-I class felonies than A-F felonies (as drug-based crimes are more prevalent 
than violent crimes such as murder).  Regardless of the tier, there is also a sizeable racial 
disparity against Blacks.  Blacks are convicted of A-F crimes about 21 times per 1,000 Black 
individuals, whereas Whites are convicted at about 5 per 1,000.  This is similar for G-I class 
felonies as well, wherein around 45 Blacks are convicted per 1,000, and only 18 Whites are 






Figure 4-4: Average conviction rate over time 
 
District Attorneys 
 I examined each District Attorney in the state of North Carolina between 2015 and 2019.  
District Attorneys in North Carolina generally serve 4-year terms; however, there are cases 
where District Attorneys retire or resign.  To try to cover for these possibilities, District 
Attorneys were checked each year.  To gather this information, I used a web archive of the 
prosecutorial district’s website to find the name of the District Attorney in that year.  Once I had 
the name of the District Attorney, I used online photographs to code their race and gender.  This 






Attorneys, there were 6 cases where the District Attorney was Black.208 Table 4-2 gives some 
basic information about these 6 Black District Attorneys, and figure 4-5 shows where these 
Black District Attorneys have served. 
Table 4-2: Black District Attorneys in North Carolina 
Name District Gender Years 
Andrew Merryweather 26 Male 2017-2019 
Robert Evans 8 Male 2015-2019 
Faris Dixon 3 Male 2019 - 
Roger Echols 16 Male 2015-2018 
Satana Deberry 16 Female 2019 - 
Avery Crump 24 Female 2019 - 
 
Figure 4-5: North Carolina prosecutorial districts 
 
I examine districts 3,16,24, and 26 in this case study, as these are the districts where the 
District Attorney changed, and I can examine how changing the race/gender of the District 
Attorney alters the incarceration rate patterns for Whites and Blacks.  The benefit of this 
 






approach is that it allows me to hold the specific context surrounding each individual district 
relatively constant and examine the effect of changing the District Attorney.     
Figures 4-6 and 4-7 show the effect that a change in DA race and gender can have on the 
Black and White conviction rates.  Figure 4-6 shows the changes for A-F class felonies, and 
Figure 4-7 shows the same for G-I class felonies.  The bars represent the average conviction rate 
for a DA across the data and are color-coded to the race and gender of the DA.  The first box 
represents district 16, where the DA transitioned from a Black male to a Black female.  The 
second box represents district 24, where the DA transitioned from a White male to a Black 
female.  Box three represents district 26, where the DA transitioned from a White male to a 
Black male.  And box four represents district 3, where the DA transitioned from a White female 
to a Black male.  Each box contains four bars, divided into two sets.  Each set represents the 
average conviction rate for one racial group for both DAs in that district.  The bar on the left is 
the former DA (who would be White everywhere except in the case of district 16, where the 


































Figure 4-7: G-I Conviction rates when DA race/gender changes 
 
Results 
 Beginning with district 24,26, and 3, the districts which had White District Attorneys in 
2015, we can see that moving from a White to a Black district attorney led to sharp decreases in 
the Black incarceration rate, regardless of the class of felony. We also see a decrease, albeit 
smaller, in the White incarceration rates (with the exception of District 3 for high-level felonies).    
This provides some evidence for a general descriptive representation story (that all descriptive 
representatives would lead to substantive representation), but there is not a large difference 
between Black men and Black women.  District 16 is a more interesting case because it is the 
only example where the representative’s race was constant (both were Black), but the gender 
changed.  Here we see that shifting from a Black male to a Black female District Attorney led to 






both felony classes, the Black incarceration rate decreased by about 4 individuals per 1,000.  In 
this case we see a small decrease in the White incarceration rate, but only for low-level felonies.   
 Overall, these results provide tentative support for H1 and no support for H2.  In regards 
to the difference between Black male and Black female representatives, we see a sharp 
difference in district 16, but no real differences in the other districts.  When switching from a 
White representative, race appears to be important, but gender not so much.  However, when 
directly comparing a switch from a Black male to a Black female, we see that the difference 
between the outcomes is quite distinct.  Contrary to my prediction, there was no real difference 
in the previously stated relationship for high and low-level felony classes.  I originally assumed 
that discretion was lower for District Attorneys in high-level felony cases, but we still see the 
incarceration rates drop, even for serious crimes.     
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Incarceration disparities 
The following section will discuss the different measures used to test the H1, using the 
following model. 
Incarceration Disparities= Legacy of Disparities + Black District Attorney + Female + 
Black * Female + Democrat + Budget per 1000 + Black poverty rate + State Random 
Effects 
Dependent Variable 
I measure incarceration rate disparities using a county-level measure of incarcerated 
individuals created by the Vera Institute, for the year 2016.  This dataset disaggregates prison 
records back to the county the individual was sent from, creating a measure of how many 






District Attorney's jurisdiction.  This creates a measure of the number of individuals that the 
District Attorney’s office is responsible for incarcerating.  I compare this raw number of 
incarcerated individuals to the population in the county that is between the ages of 15-64 (this 
age restriction more accurately measures the population that is likely to be incarcerated) in order 
to account for the difference in population between different judicial districts, and differences in 
population sizes between different racial groups.  I divide the White and Black incarcerated 
populations by the 15- 64 population for each race accordingly, creating an incarceration rate for 
each group.  To generate a disparity score, I then use a rate ratio, constructed by dividing the 
incarceration rate for Blacks by the incarceration rate for Whites.  This rate ratio uses the 
following equation: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑜𝑝. 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)
(15 − 64 𝑃𝑜𝑝. 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡)
 





  This creates a measure of disparity between the Black and White incarceration rates 
using the White rate as a baseline.  This measure ranges from 0 to infinity, with 1 representing 
true equality.  Any score less than 1 represents any district where Blacks are incarcerated at a 
higher rate than Whites, and any score greater than 1 the opposite.  One easy way to understand 
the rate ratio is thinking of the rate ratio as the number you need to multiple the White rate by to 
get the Black rate.  Put another way, the rate ratio is the number of times that the Black rate is 
higher than the White rate.  For example, if the rate ratio is 2, this means you’d need to multiply 
the White rate by 2 to get the Black rate, or that the Black rate is twice as high as the White rate.  






how high the disparity score is on average; in my sample of District Attorney jurisdictions, the 
disparity score is about 5.5, meaning Black individuals are 5.5 times as likely to be incarcerated 
than their White peers, accounting for different population sizes.   
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics for Incarceration Rates 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
White Incarceration 
Rate 
588 0.000 0.022 0.005 0.003 
Black Incarceration 
Rate 
588 0.004 0.114 0.027 0.015 
Incarceration Rate 
Ratio 
588 0.749 28.83 5.94 3.647 
 
Independent Variable: Descriptive Representation 
To understand the racial and gender breakdowns of District Attorneys, I used data from the 
Women Donor’s Network’s Justice for All program to identify the District Attorney for the 2014-
2016 period (Justice for All 2014).  This dataset records the race and gender of different district 
attorneys, using publicly available resources such as voter files, which was then matched using 
direct outreach.  Table 4-4 shows the descriptive statistics for a race and gender breakdown of the 
District Attorney for those districts with complete information.209 One thing of note, the vast 
majority, over 90% of District Attorneys are White, and there is also a bias towards men.  DAs 





209 Full information includes connecting the District Attorney information to BJS sources for institutional variables 






Table 4-4: Descriptive Statistics for Race/Gender 
 
Male Female Total 
White 428 113 541 
Black 25 22 47 
Total 453 135 588 
 
Controls 
In this analysis, I control for the partisanship of the District Attorney, the legacies of 
disparities, the budget per 1000 adults of the District Attorney’s office, the poverty rate for their 
judicial jurisdiction, and state random effects.   Table 4-5 shows the descriptive statistics for 
these controls.   
Table 4-5: Descriptive Statistics for Controls 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Partisanship 
(Democrat) 
588 0.000 1.000 0.626 0.484 
2000-2005 Disparity 
Score 
588 1.744 177.5 9.886 8.931 
Budget per 1000 pop. 588 0.628 221.8 14.70 15.23 
Black Poverty Rate 588 0.027 0.697 0.294 0.097 
 
Partisanship 
 As discussed in previous chapters, one general rival theory to descriptive representation 
is partisanship.210  Because most Blacks are Democrats, and Democrats are generally associated 
 






with providing substantive representation for Blacks, it could be that any finding of descriptive 
representation is spurious.  To account for this, I control for the partisanship of the District 
Attorney.  District Attorney partisanship was collected along with racial information.  In 
formally partisan districts, formal partisanship was used to code the partisanship of the District 
Attorney.  Similar to other chapters, I assume that even officially non-partisan offices are filled 
with partisans.  However, without official partisanship data, coders used news sources, voter 
records, and published interviews (among other things) to codify the partisanship of District 
Attorneys.  Partisanship is coded as 0 for Republicans and 1 for Democrats; those who belong to 
other parties, or for whom no reliable partisanship information could be found were dropped.   
Legacy 
 In the same vein as in the previous chapters, I posit that District Attorneys inherit a 
system that had formed long before they assumed office.  This is a particularly important control 
for incarceration rates, as those incarcerated by previous District Attorneys can still be 
incarcerated when the new District Attorney takes office, and will still count towards disparities 
in the measure I have created.  This means that even the most progressive District Attorney could 
be penalized if I do not control for the system and policy outcomes they inherited.  It should be 
noted that District Attorneys can pursue changes to cases previously tried by their predecessors 
and reduce the charges for those incarcerated, thereby giving them the ability to alter the status 
quo they inherit, as well as the incarcerations during their tenure.  To control for the path-
dependent nature of the outcome, I employ a legacy term, which controls for the incarceration 
rate before the current District Attorney had a chance to impact the policy.  The legacy of 
disparities is the same measure of disparities used in 2016 but from the early 2000s.  As records 






the 2000s because this is the period after the advent of the “Tough on Crime” era, generally used 
to refer to the mid to late 1990s, while still being well before the recent upsurge in minority 
District Attorneys.211   
DA Office Budget 
 Not all District Attorneys have the same material capabilities to address systemic issues 
in their offices.  Some districts are simply better funded than others, and because of this, some 
District Attorneys may have more resources to devote to the programs that can address racial 
injustices, such as anti-bias training and blind case reviews.  To account for differing levels of 
material capacity, I control for the budget (in thousands of dollars) of the District Attorney’s 
office, pegging it to the size of the district’s population to account for workload.  In essence, this 
creates a measure of resource disparity that accounts for the different population sizes of 
different districts.  Budgetary data comes from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, National 
Prosecutors Census.  This census is part of a larger project to collect statistics for prosecutor’s 
offices, using period surveys since the 1990s and two censuses in 2001 and 2007.  I used the 
most current data from 2007, calculating the budget per 1000 adult (15-64) district residents.    
Poverty Rate 
 A fact of the criminal justice system is that poverty is correlated with crime212.  While the 
casual arrow is a bit murky - it could be that high crime causes economic instability, or that poor 
 
211 It would of course, be best to have the disparity score for the year before each individual District Attorney took 
office.  However, due to the spotty nature of early incarceration rate data, and the lack of data on when District 
Attorney’s formally took office, this was not possible for this project. 
 
212 William Bailey, “Poverty, Inequality, and City Homicide Rates. Some Not So Unexpected Findings,” Criminology 
(Beverly Hills) 22, no. 4 (November 1, 1984): 531–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1984.tb00314.x; 
Matthew R. Lee, “Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Homicide,” The Sociological Quarterly 41, no. 2 (March 1, 
2000): 189–206, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2000.tb00091.x; Travis C. Pratt and Francis T. Cullen, 






economic conditions steer the impoverished towards crime to acquire essential economic relief - 
this requires consideration when discussing incarceration rates and disparities.  If a District 
Attorney runs a district with a higher poverty rate, we should expect that there will be more 
crimes the District Attorney is asked to prosecute and, therefore, more individuals incarcerated 
by that District Attorney.  And if a District Attorney runs a district with a high Black poverty 
rate, we should expect their Black incarceration rate to be higher.  Therefore, I control for this 
exogenous effect by including a measure of the poverty rate amongst Blacks in the District 
Attorney’s district.  This measure comes from county-level Census data, aggregated up to 
judicial districts in the same manner as the incarceration data.  I divide the case of Black poverty 
(as defined by the Census) by the size of the adult Black population in the district, giving me a 
measure of the Black poverty rate in the district.           
Results 
Table 4-6 reports the results of the OLS model.  Recall that this model predicts the 
disparity score, so positive coefficients are associated with deepening disparities, whereas 
negative coefficients are associated with more equitable outcomes.  Since White male District 
Attorneys are the reference category for the other groups, the coefficients for the Black, Female, 
and interaction term should be read as how disparities under District Attorneys of these sub-
groups compare to White male District Attorneys.  The Black variable describes the effect of 
Black men compared to White men.  The female variable describes White women compared to 
White men.  The interaction describes the difference between Black men and Black women on 
its own, and adding all three variables (Black, Female, and the interaction) would be the effect 






I find a positive but insignificant coefficient for the Black and female variables.  
However, I find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between race and 
gender.  This negative result indicated that Black women are associated with smaller disparities 
than Black men, which supports my hypothesis.  This effect is substantively large as well.  Black 
female District Attorneys have, on average, a disparity score about 1.5 points lower than their 
Black male peers.  In practice, this would be equivalent to moving from a world where Blacks 
are imprisoned at 2.5 times the rate of Whites, to racial parity. 
We see that the legacy of disparities is positively associated with current disparities, as 
expected.  This is in line with what I found in previous chapters, and other scholars have shown: 
policy outcomes are “sticky” and resistant to change over time.  I also find that being a Democrat 
is associated with a significant decrease in disparities.  This supports a general partisanship story, 
that Democratic District Attorneys, by virtue of their partisanship and likely beliefs are more 
cognizant of disparities and address them.  Furthermore, as budgets increase (controlling for 
population size), I find a significant decrease in disparities.  This provides some evidence for the 
material capabilities argument presented earlier, and implications for this will be discussed in the 
following section.  
Finally, I find an insignificant but positive relationship between the Black poverty rate 
and disparities.  This is somewhat surprising: there are strong, established relationships between 
poverty and crime,213 and one would expect that increasing the Black poverty rate would lead to 
an increase in the Black crime rate and, therefore, the Black incarceration rate by extension.  
 
213 Bailey, “Poverty, Inequality, and City Homicide Rates. Some Not So Unexpected Findings”; Lee, Porter, and 
Comfort, “Consequences of Family Member Incarceration”; Pratt and Cullen, “Assessing Macro-Level Predictors 






However, as discussed earlier, many progressive District Attorneys have actively sought to stop 
criminalizing poverty and the associated low-level offenses.  Therefore, it could be that poverty 
doesn’t have the expected effect specifically because the representation variables are capturing 
the effect.       














Budget per 1000 -0.01*** 
 (0.00) 




State RE Yes 
N 588 
Overall R-Square 0.37 




A large body of work examines the role of race and gender in how representatives act; 






This chapter seeks to further our understanding of how descriptive representatives provide 
substantive representation for minorities by examining how Black male and Black female 
representatives differ.   I argue that race and gender intersect to create predictably different 
patterns in how representatives act, primarily through differing expectations surrounding 
stereotypes.  I argue that Black men will adopt a tough-on-crime approach to survive politically, 
but Black women will not be allowed this option.   
I employed two tests of my theory, a case study of four prosecutorial districts in North 
Carolina, and a cross-sectional examination of every prosecutorial district in the United States.  I 
find compelling evidence to support my expectations that Black women will reduce disparities in 
incarceration rates more than their Black male peers.  In the four districts in North Carolina, I 
found that descriptive representatives were broadly associated with decreases in the Black 
incarceration rate.  However, in the case where the District Attorney changed from a Black man 
to a Black woman, I found a steep decrease in the Black incarceration rate.  In the cross-sectional 
model, I found a significant and substantially large difference between Black men and Black 
women.  On average, Black women were associated with a decrease in the disparity score of 
about 1.5, the same as moving from a case where the Black incarceration rate is 2.5 times the 
White rate to racial parity.   
This chapter was designed to be an exploration into how descriptive representation 
operates intersectionally.  However, there are still many questions that remain unanswered.  
These results deal with a specific type of office, District Attorneys, and a specific policy arena, 
the criminal justice system.  How does race and gender intersect in executive positions, or in 






focused on the relationship between descriptive representatives of different races, but how might 
White men and White women differ on racialized issues?  Lastly, how will intersectionality 
operate in a more cooperative position, such as legislatures?  Should we expect male and female 
representatives of the same race to cooperate on their shared values, or might we expect some 
competition for scarce attention and resource to their varying needs?  Answering these questions 
will provide us with a clearer picture of how race and gender operate jointly in the venue of 








CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION 
 I began this project with two questions.  What role do Black representatives play in 
reducing the lived inequalities in America?  Under what conditions should we expect Black 
representatives to successfully bring about more equal outcomes?  To answer these questions, I 
explored three different moderators affecting the link between descriptive and substantive 
representation.  In Chapter 2, I examined multi-level political incorporation as a necessary 
condition for substantive representation.  Chapter 3 examined agenda access through leadership 
positions as a separate necessary condition for substantive representation.  In Chapter 4, I 
explored the intersection of race and gender.  In my analysis, I measured the ability of 
descriptive representatives to change policy outcomes in poverty rates, residential segregation, 
and incarceration rates.   
The evidence presented in these chapters paints a clear picture of the conditional 
relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation.  Increasing the 
number of descriptive representatives can lead to reductions in the disparities we observe in the 
world, but only under the right conditions.  Descriptive representatives within legislatures need 
to be able to pass legislation in their chamber, and in a multi-level governing context, they need 
higher levels of government not to interfere.  Beyond their ability to get legislation passed, 
descriptive representatives also need to occupy leadership positions within their legislatures in 
order to ensure their priorities make it onto the legislative agenda.  Lastly, descriptive 






manner.  Differences in gender can lead some representatives to focus more on challenging the 
status quo than others.   
What do these findings mean for scholars of descriptive representation and for American 
politics more broadly?  First, it is important for scholars to put more emphasis on the results of 
descriptive representation.  This is important for two reasons.  First, empirically, if we focus on 
the specific actions of descriptive representatives, we may only be measuring symbolic 
substantive representation.  If a member takes actions to promote minority issues, but the 
political context is such that those actions do not translate into real changes, this is something we 
need to consider.  Second, normatively, the major reason we care about descriptive and 
substantive representation is because of the adverse effects of racial disparities on minority 
communities.  One impetus behind examining descriptive representatives is we theorize they 
may be able to fix issues for minority communities, so directly measuring their ability to do so is 
important.  Moving to policy outcomes also has the benefit of measuring unobserved actions 
representatives might take to affect change.        
Second, it is important to discuss descriptive representation, particularly in how it affects 
outcomes, in a multi-level context when appropriate.  Descriptive representatives, in whatever 
capacity they serve, are limited by the powers of their positions.  We should not expect 
descriptive representatives to affect policies they have no power over, and therefore, we need to 
more fully model the multi-level context that many policy outcomes are made in.  One issue not 
discussed in this book is how the relative importance of different levels of government may 






controlled by decisions at the state level that only state representation should matter, and that the 
same would hold true for issues determined at the local level.   
Third, a lot of scholarly attention in regards to descriptive representation has to deal with 
majority-minority districts.  This attention is not unwarranted.  Proponents point out the 
importance of these districts in helping descriptive representatives get elected, but opponents 
point out that these districts hurt the chances of Democrats to hold the majority, and thereby 
relegating these new descriptive representatives to the minority.  This research, particularly 
Chapter 2, demonstrates that it seems both sides are right.  While it is important for Democrats to 
be in the majority for descriptive representatives to provide substantive representation, one 
consistent finding throughout this book is that the right political context without descriptive 
representatives is associated with worse disparities.  This points to a conflict for redistricting if 
we seek to maximize substantive representation.  You need to maximize the number of 
descriptive representatives while still maintaining a Democratic majority.   
The findings in Chapter 3 point to a different understudied facet of descriptive 
representation, as the hierarchy within legislatures and the commensurate control over the 
legislative agenda can prevent the provisions of substantive representation.  Even with political 
incorporation and many descriptive representatives, the provision of substantive representation 
can be prevented by those in positions of institutional power.  Given the various barriers Black 
members face in achieving such positions, scholars and activists should put renewed interest in 
figuring out how to dismantle such barriers.  However, my analysis did not examine committees 
in state legislatures, nor did it examine the role of outside forces in shaping the agenda 






when public attention to racial issues is low.  During periods of renewed public attention, such as 
the mass protests during the summer of 2020, we generally see these issues make their way onto 
the agenda regardless of the race of the leadership.   
Lastly, in Chapter 4, I examined the role of race and gender intersectionally, with some 
promising results pointing towards differences in how intersectional descriptive representation 
may operate.  This is one area that would greatly benefit from renewed interest from scholars.  I 
suspect that the differences between male and female representative of different races may prove 
to be very context specific, but that requires more information to test sufficiently.  However, the 
findings presented in this book show compelling evidence that the use of an intersectional lens in 







APPENDIX A: MODIFIED RATE RATIO 
As identified in footnote 5, there is an issue with the rate ratio, as it is asymmetric about 
0.  All cases where the poverty rate for Blacks is higher than the poverty rate for Whites exist 
between 0 and 1, whereas all cases where the White poverty rate is higher exist between 1 and 
infinity.  I address this potential issue by creating what I refer to as the modified rate ratio, which 
is centered at and symmetric in relation to 0. 
To create this measure, I consider three scenarios.  If the rate for Blacks is higher than 
Whites, I take the Black rate divided by the White rate and subtract 1.    If the rate for Blacks is 
lower than Whites, I take the White rate divided by the Black rate and subtract 1, then multiple 
by -1.  If the rates are equal, I set the score equal to 0.214  This results in a scale where zero 
represents equality.  A positive score represents an increasingly high Black poverty rate in 
relation to the White poverty rate, and a negative score the opposite.  Therefore, if descriptive 
representatives lower the modified rate ratio, they are reducing the disparities between Blacks 
and Whites and would be providing substantive representation for their group. 
A modified rate ratio should be read as the number of times you must add the Black score 
to itself to get the numerator score.215  For example, if the modified rate ratio is 1, you add the 
White poverty score to itself, and that is the Black poverty rate.  You can also add one to the 
score (subtract one if it is negative) and multiply the denominator group's rate by this to get the 
 
214 One potential weakness of ratio-based measures is their high volatility when the total population is low, or when 
the number of positive cases is very low.  This is potentially twice as bad for this measure, as it is a ratio of ratios, 
meaning if either of the ratios have the above problem you can quickly have an issue of a score close to positive or 
negative infinity.  In order to ensure stability in measurements, a minimum population of 500 individuals of each 
race, and a minimum number of cases of poverty of 50 was set for each race.    
 
215 If the modified rate ratio is negative, it is the number of times you must add the numerator group’s poverty rate to 






numerator group's rate.  Table 5-1 demonstrates this measure for three different hypothetical 
cities.  Table 5-2 reports descriptive statistics for poverty rates across my sample, and Figure 5-1 
shows the frequency distribution.  From Table 5-2 we can see that disparities in the cities in my 
sample are still very real; in the average city you need to add the White poverty rate to itself 1.33 
times to get the Black rate (or multiply it by 2.33).  The frequency distribution shows that these 
rate ratios are largely normally distributed with a slight left skew. 









5% 10% 2 1 
5% 5% 1 0 
10% 5% .5 -1 
 
Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics for Poverty Rates 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
White Poverty Rate 458 0.025 0.385 0.122 0.061 
Black Poverty Rate 458 0.002 0.682 0.256 0.112 
Poverty Rate Ratio 446 0.035 7.941 2.301 1.009 
Mod. Poverty Rate Ratio 446 -0.780 6.941 1.330 1.000 
Legacy Rate Ratio 256 0.840 10.351 4.051 1.695 











Figure 5-1: Frequency Distribution of Modified Poverty Rate Ratio 
 
Figure 5-2: Frequency Distribution of Modified Legacy Poverty Rate Ratio 
 
Table 5-3 shows the results of my model using the modified rate ratio (for both 






from the results obtained in the main model, demonstrating the robustness of my findings to the 



































Poverty Legacy  0.07* 
 (0.03) 
Percent State Leg. Black  0.00 
 (0.01) 
State Incorporation -0.75 
 (1.10) 




Percent City Council Black  0.01 
 (0.01) 
City Incorporation  0.78*** 
 (0.17) 




Black House Rep -0.02 
 (0.41) 
State Leg. Professionalism -0.02** 
 (0.01) 
Black Mayor -0.06 
 (0.14) 
South  0.10 
 (0.17) 
Black Population Share -0.92 
 (0.52) 
Constant  1.62*** 
 (0.24) 
Incorporation Def. Multilevel 
State RE Yes 
N 212 
Overall R-Square 0.21 







APPENDIX B: DATA LOSS 
 In this appendix, I will discuss how observations were lost from my main dataset of 500 
cities to the 212 cities included in the main analysis.  Table 5-3 will track the number of 
observations lost in each step I discuss here.  This project began with a list of the 500 largest (by 
population) cities in the US as designated by the Census.  Of these 500 cities, I was able to find 
full local 2016 representation data for 458.  The cities that data could not be found for mainly 
had a small internet presence and could not be reached via other methods.  I then apply my 
population constraints (need at least 500 people from each racial group, and 50 cases of poverty 
for each racial group), resulting in 12 observations being lost (446 remaining).  I then added in 
the legacy poverty data and applied the same population threshold.  This results in 190 
observations being lost.  Some of these observations are lost due to a lack of information, but the 
majority are because the observations do not meet the population threshold.  I then add the 
partisanship data.  This data was simulated from underlying voter precinct data; however, this 
data was not available for every state, namely AR, VA, WA, and UT did not have the necessary 
data.  This resulted in a relatively low amount of data lost, 30 observations, as these states did 
not have many cities in the starting data.  I then included mayoral data, for which 14 
observations were lost.  All of these observations were mayors that were in the Hispanic or other 



















Representation data 42 458 
2016 Population Threshold 12 446 
Legacy Poverty data 190 256 
Partisanship data 30 226 
Mayor data 14 212 
























APPENDIX C: ALTERNATE POPULATION THRESHOLDS 
 In my analysis, I apply a population and poverty threshold to ensure stable rate ratios.  In 
order to ensure my results are not a result of this decision, I run the same model using larger and 
smaller thresholds.  First, I employ a population threshold of 100 and a poverty threshold of 10.  
Second, I employ a population threshold of 1000 and a poverty threshold of 100.  Table 5-4 
reports the results of the robustness checks.  Each of these models were done using the multi-
level incorporation specification discussed in the chapter.  Neither of these specifications alters 





















 Population 1000, 
Poverty 1000 
Poverty Legacy  0.04*  0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Percent State Leg. Black  0.00  0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
State Incorporation -0.06 -0.50 
 (1.25) (1.03) 
State Incorporation * Percent State Leg. 
Black 
 0.02  0.06 
 (0.11) (0.09) 
Percent City Council Black  0.00  0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
City Incorporation  0.57***  0.73*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
City Incorporation * Percent City Council 
Black  
-0.01*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Black House Rep -0.15 -0.13 
 (0.40) (0.38) 
State Leg. Professionalism -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Black Mayor  0.11 -0.02 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
South  0.06  0.11 
 (0.19) (0.16) 
Black Population Share -0.63 -1.08* 
 (0.58) (0.50) 
Constant  2.61***  2.53*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
Incorporation Definition Multi-Level Multi-Level 
 State RE Yes Yes 
N 251 188 
Overall R-Square 0.15 0.28 
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